

THE CIP REPORT

Homeland Security Advisory Council & UASI Updates

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This edition of *The CIP Report* has a dual focus owing to the recent activities of both the Department of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Advisory Council. Earlier this month DHS unveiled the new strategy for Urban Area Security Initiatives (UASI) grants, highlighting a shift from individual cities to 35 urban areas that comprise 95 cities total. Additionally, on January 10th, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) presented its report on Weapons of Mass Effect to Secretary Chertoff. While both the HSAC and the UASI grant structure will be covered in greater depth within this issue, both are connected by a shared vision of risk-based decision making.

This concept of risk- based decision making, while not new, is getting considerable coverage in recent activities within the homeland security community. As Secretary Chertoff stated when presenting the new risk-based formula used for the new UASI grants, "our security is much too important to be determined with funding decisions that are driven by arbitrary formulas." Furthermore, he believes that this represents "taking a giant step forward in implementing this risk-based strategy. It's going to be more robust. It's going to be more precise. It's going to be more analytically sound. And it's going to address a number of the criticisms that have been made about past funding under this program and other programs as well." To some urban areas that have no longer made this new and largely inclusive list, this new strategy seems less equitable than the previous UASI grant structure; however, as DHS and other proponents of the plan would argue, it is instead fair- allocating resources to the areas most at risk, while reducing resources to those areas who have already seen improvements in security through previous funding or who do not face as high of a threat.

Continuing the concept of risk- based decision making, the HSAC Task Force on Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) argued for more decisions based on a benefits and costs structure. This, in addition to other recommendations made by the Task Force to further build upon previous improvements to prevent the entry of (WME), represents a shifting tide in decision making.

Also included in this issue, we have a highlight of a recent event hosted by the CIP Program featuring researchers from Sweden, organized to discuss research agendas and future funding priorities in critical infrastructure protection and homeland security for each nation. We also include information on another event in which the CIP Program will be participating, the Critical Infrastructure Resilience/ Infrastructure Security for the Built Environment (ISBE), which will be held at the D.C. Convention Center from February 15-17 2006.



School of Law
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION PROGRAM

John A. McCarthy
Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
George Mason University, School of Law

Homeland Security Advisory Council Provides Expert Advice on Securing Nation

The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to serve as the Secretary's primary council. The Council is comprised of leaders from state and local government, first responder communities, the private sector, and academia.

The purpose of the HSAC is to provide organizationally independent advice and recommendations to the Secretary of the Department aiding in the creation and implementation of critical and actionable policy relating to the security of the American homeland. The HSAC serves solely as an advisory body with the goal of providing advice predicated upon the request of the Secretary or the identification of issues of relevance and concern to the mission of the Department and the security of America. The HSAC provides the Secretary with advice in the following areas:

POLICY DEVELOPMENT: Advisory recommendations on developing the implementation of comprehensive national strategies to secure the United States from terrorist threats, attacks, and/or national emergencies;

COORDINATION: Advisory recommendations on coordinating the implementation of such comprehensive national strategies within the Department; among the Department's Federal Government partners; and among state local and tribal governments, first responders, the

private sector, and experts within academia and the research communities;

IMPLEMENTATION: Advisory recommendations on the feasibility and effectiveness of implementing specific measures to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist threats, attacks, or national emergencies within the United States;

IMPLEMENTATION EVALUATION: Advisory recommendations to the Secretary on ways to improve coordination, cooperation, and communication among Federal, State, local, and tribal officials; the private sector; and other organizations through the evaluation of the Secretary's policies and plans in light of the actual implementation of those plans;

FORCE MULTIPLICATION: Providing a vital means for the Secretary to leverage diverse expertise by collecting and analyzing scholarly research, technological advice, and "best practice" processes and organizational management techniques from Federal, state, tribal and local governments; the private sector; and other organizations throughout the nation.

The HSAC consists of no more than 21 members plus a number of *ex officio* members appointed by the Secretary. Each of the regular members generally serves for three years in order to promote *(Continued, Page 3)*

HSAC Members

William H. Webster, Vice-Chair, Homeland Security Advisory Council

Duane Ackerman, Chairman and CEO, Bell South Corporation

Richard A. Andrews, Senior Director, Homeland Security Projects, National Center for Crisis and Continuity Coordination

Norman R. Augustine, Former Chairman and CEO, Lockheed Martin Corporation

Kathleen M. Bader, Business Group President and Corporate Vice President, The Dow Chemical Company

David Bell, Chairman and CEO, The Interpublic Group of Companies

Elliott Broidy, Commissioner, Los Angeles City Fire and Police Pension Fund

Chuck Canterbury, Horry County Police Department, and President, Fraternal Order of Police, Conway, South Carolina

Frank J. Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security, George Washington University

Jared L. Cohon, President, Carnegie Mellon University *(Continued, Page 4)*

HSAC (Cont. from Page 2) membership continuity and currency of expertise. In order for the Secretary to fully leverage broad-ranging education and experience, the HSAC membership is professionally, technically, and culturally diverse. The members

are national leaders in professions and communities including:

- A. Police, Fire, and Public Works,
- B. Public Health, and Hospital Managers,
- C. State, Local, and Tribal Officials

- D. National Policy Makers,
- E. Experts in Academia and the Research Community,
- F. Private Sector Officials,
- G. Owners and Operators of Critical Industries, Resources, and Infrastructure.

(Continued, Page 4)

New Members Appointed to the Homeland Security Advisory Council

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff recently announced the appointment of Elliott Broidy, Tom Foley and John Magaw to serve on his Homeland Security Advisory Council.

The Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), as established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, is the Secretary's primary council and is comprised of experts from state and local governments, first responder communities, academia and the private sector. Members of the Council provide advice and recommendations to Secretary Chertoff on homeland security issues.

"Each of these individuals brings a vast amount of experience and expertise from public service and the private sector to the Homeland Security Advisory Council," said Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. "I am grateful that these accomplished leaders will provide important counsel and new ideas that contribute to the department's efforts to make our nation more prepared and secure."

Elliott Broidy is a commissioner for the Los Angeles City Fire and Police Pension Fund and serves on the governing boards of several large charitable and educational organizations, including the Los Angeles Police Foundation. He is Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Broidy Capital Management, a private investment company which he founded in 1991 that specializes in investing in private equity and marketable securities. He is also founder and Chairman of Markstone Capital Partners, an \$800 million private equity fund.

Tom Foley, of Spokane, Wash., and Washington, D.C., is a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served 15 terms from January 1965 to January 1995. During his time in the House, Foley served as Democratic Whip and Majority Leader. Between 1989 and 1995, he was the 49th Speaker of the House. Following his congressional service, President Clinton appointed Foley as Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, where he served from 1995 to 1997. Later, he served as U.S. Ambassador to

Japan until 2001. Foley is currently a partner with the law firm of Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP. He also serves as a member of the Defense Policy Board with the Department of Defense and is the Chairman of the North American Trilateral Commission.

John Magaw, of Annapolis, Md., served as Undersecretary for Security at the Department of Transportation and was responsible for implementing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, which augmented transportation security nationwide in air, land, water and rail modes. He has a distinguished career in security and law enforcement, having served as: Director of the U.S. Secret Service; Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, where he coordinated and directed policy and organization changes in the aftermath of the Waco, Texas, tragedy; Senior Advisor to the Director of FEMA for terrorism preparedness; Acting Director and Acting Deputy Director of FEMA; and Acting Executive Director of the Office of National Preparedness. ❖

HSAC (Cont. from Page 3) The HSAC Chair, with the concurrence of the Executive Director, may establish any number of subcommittees, task forces, or working groups to exchange information with other entities and to advise the HSAC. The Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) is one of the task forces established by the chair.

The purpose of the Critical Infrastructure Task Force (CITF) is to review ongoing critical infrastructure initiatives and to make recommendations for policy and

planning that will ultimately ensure reliable delivery of services, while reducing the consequences of any disruption of services. The CITF has focused its recommendations on resilience initiatives versus protection alone. The group's activities are largely premised on its observations that resilience is well-aligned with a risk management strategy, that resilience-based planning is gaining momentum, that a focus on resilience drives comprehensive planning, and that resilience may offer the "business case" that is needed. ❖

Why Resilience and Not Just Protection

Risk = f[Threat] f[Vulnerability] f[Consequence]

Protection: To keep from harm, attack or injury

Resilience: An ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or change.

Note: *Daniel Ostergaard has moved on from his position as Executive Director of the Homeland Security Advisory Council. In a farewell message to colleagues, he stated that he was leaving DHS with a "deep sense of humility as one privileged to serve our country at a difficult and challenging time in our nation's history." His replacement has not yet been named. We wish Dan and his family well.*

HSAC Members (Cont. from Page 2)

Ruth A. David
President and CEO,
ANSER (Analytic Services Inc.)

Tom Foley
Former member of the U.S. House
of Representatives

Lee H. Hamilton
Director, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars

Herb Kelleher
Executive Chairman, Southwest
Airlines Co.

Major General Bruce Lawlor
U.S. Army (Retired)

John Magaw
Former Undersecretary for
Security, Dept. of Transportation

Patrick McCrory
Mayor, Charlotte, North Carolina

Erle A. Nye
Chairman and CEO,
TXU Corporation

Mitt Romney
Governor of Massachusetts

James R. Schlesinger
Chairman, Board of Trustees, The
MITRE Corporation

Lydia W. Thomas
President and CEO,
Mitretek Systems, Inc.

Anthony A. Williams
Mayor, District of Columbia

HSAC Task Force Supports Risk Based Approach for WME Prevention

On January 10, 2006, the Homeland Security Advisory Council's Task Force on Weapons of Mass Effect (WME) presented its report to Secretary Chertoff. Charged with recommending specific steps the nation could take to prevent the entry of WME into the country, the task force organized subgroups based on methods of entry (air, land and sea) and assessed information threat, current systems, plans and practices in WME prevention, while identifying critical deficiencies and recommendations. Presented by Lydia Thomas, the Task Force acknowledge the progress made through the creation of new organizations, programs, facilities and dedicated people, but also pointed out deficiencies in citizen and foreign entity engagement, the

absence of an integrated systems approach and a systemic, risk based approach to investment, as well as outdated deterrence concepts and a lack of sufficient urgency and priority in technology.

To address these deficiencies, a conceptual framework using a systems view was presented, based on a three thrust strategy to a) neutralize the terrorists, b) secure WME and /or critical components, and c) detect and interdict in transit. Further, the Task Force recommended that the problem be considered in three dimensions- geographical / spatial, functional and operational.

Perhaps the highlight of this report was the considerable

attention paid to the risk reduction approach, which was argued to be central to all decision making criterion for WME prevention. Using the systems view presented, the Task Force argued that decisions could be made based on benefits and costs, rather than ancillary factors.

The Task force recommendations included instituting a risk based process for resource allocation, improving private sector contributions to the process for risk management, initiating a system management effort, and updating deterrence through clear policy, an expanded layered defense system, and engaged citizens. The Task Force also recommended strengthening the authority of the Secretary and the Homeland Security Council. ❖

Members of Weapons of Mass Effect Task Force

Lydia Thomas - HSAC (Chair)	Steve Gross - Private Sector Senior Advisory Committee (PVSAC)
Jerry Cohon - HSAC (Vice Chair)	Kathleen Bader -HSAC
Norm Augustine - HSAC (Chair, Air Domain Subgroup)	Jack Skolds - PVSAC
James Schlesinger - HSAC (Chair, Land Domain Subgroup)	Dirk Kempthorne - State and Local Senior Advisory Committee (SLSAC)
David Abshire - APRSAC (Chair, Sea Domain Subgroup)	Brian Sandoval - SLSAC
Bill Webster - HSAC	Bernard Kerik - Emergency Response Senior Advisory Committee (ERSAC)
Chuck Canterbury - HSAC	Scott Lillibridge - ERSAC
Lee Hamilton - HSAC	Jane Perlov - ERSAC
Victoria Haynes - Academe Policy and Research Senior Advisory Committee (APRSAC)	Edward Plaughter - ERSAC
Dan Goure - APRSAC	Steve Kerr - APRSAC
Roxane Silver - APRSAC	Kathryn Knapp - Federal
Rocky Spane - APRSAC	Richard Davis - Federal
	Benjamin Gray - Federal
	Michael Fullerton - Federal

DHS Introduces Risk-based Formula for Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently announced \$765 million in direct funding for high threat urban areas as part of the fiscal year 2006 Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). UASI provides resources for the unique equipment, training, planning, and exercise needs of select high threat urban areas.

The fact of the matter is, our security is much too important to be determined with funding decisions that are driven by arbitrary formulas or political formulas or a desire to give everybody a little bit of something. What we have to do is drive these decisions by looking at where the major risks are and allocating our priorities accordingly. We have to invest our federal money strategically, protecting those communities where there are national and regional implications, using a disciplined, analytical method that properly evaluates the risks.

Secretary Michael Chertoff

"The department is investing federal funding into our communities facing the greatest risk and demonstrating the greatest need in order to receive the highest return in our nation's security,"

said Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff. "Our nation's preparedness and the support of our emergency responders on the frontlines of the war against terrorism must be a shared effort. We will continue to champion funding on the basis of risk and need, and we urge Congress to do the same to ensure that our finite resources are allocated and prioritized successfully."

In fiscal year 2006, the department identified 35 areas eligible to apply for and receive funding. These 35 areas encompass 95 cities with populations of 100,000 or more. This year's formula promotes a "super" UASI concept that is designed to build greater regional capabilities across a geographic area. In addition, 11 urban areas from the fiscal year 2005 UASI have been identified as eligible to apply for sustainment funding in fiscal year 2006, to ensure that strategic investments made thus far can be completed and to identify projects that, if funded, would significantly reduce risk.

All eligible applicants must submit an investment justification, which identifies needs and outlines the intended security enhancement plan to be addressed with funding, to meet the target capabilities outlined in the National Preparedness Goal. Investment justifications will be reviewed, scored, and prioritized along with risk factors to determine which investments should be funded to best address need and minimize risk.

The fiscal year 2006 UASI list of eligible applicants and recipients is determined through a robust risk formula that considers three primary variables: consequence, vulnerability, and threat. Factors such as the presence of international borders, population and population density, the location of critical infrastructure, formal mutual aid cooperation, law enforcement investigations and enforcement activity are considered in correlation with the risk formula for UASI determinations.

Cities on the UASI list with shared boundaries were combined for fiscal year 2006 into a single entity and urbanized areas outside the official city limits were also included in order to establish a geographic area for enhanced risk analysis, reflecting a regional approach to shared risk and risk-mitigation. Other expansions to the program in fiscal year 2006 include the incorporation of threat analysis from intelligence community products that reflect risk as seen through various attack modes, such as the incorporation of transient populations and greater depth and breadth in infrastructure data.

More than \$2.1 billion has been allocated through UASI since the 2003 fiscal year. Since 9/11, \$8.6 billion has been provided in overall grant funding to states and territories to enhance first responder capabilities in preventing, protecting and responding to acts of terrorism. ❖

FY06 Urban Area Security Initiative Funding

State	Candidate Urban Area	Geographic Area Captured in the Data Count	Previously Designated Urban Areas Included
AZ	Phoenix Area*	Chadler, Gilbert, Glendale, Mesa, Peoria, Phoenix, Scottsdale, Tempe, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Phoenix, AZ
CA	Anaheim / Santa Ana Area	Anaheim, Costa Mesa, Garden Grove, Fullerton, Huntington Beach, Irvine, Orange, Santa Ana, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Anaheim, CA; Santa Ana, CA
	Bay Area	Berkeley, Daly City, Fremont, Hayward, Oakland, Palo Alto, Richmond, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa Clara, Sunnyvale, Vallejo, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	San Francisco, CA; San Jose, CA; Oakland, CA
	Los Angeles/Long Beach Area	Burbank, Glendale, Inglewood, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, Santa Monica, Santa Clarita, Torrance, Simi Valley, Thousand Oaks, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Los Angeles, CA; Long Beach, CA
	Sacramento Area*	Elk Grove, Sacramento, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Sacramento, CA
	San Diego Area*	Chula Vista, Escondido, and San Diego, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	San Diego, CA
CO	Denver Area	Arvada, Aurora, Denver, Lakewood, Westminster, Thornton, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Denver, CO
DC	National Capital Region	National Capital Region and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	National Capital Region, DC
FL	Fort Lauderdale Area	Fort Lauderdale, Hollywood, Miami Gardens, Miramar, Pembroke Pines, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	N/A
	Jacksonville Area	Jacksonville and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Jacksonville, FL
	Miami Area	Hialeah, Miami, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Miami, FL
	Orlando Area	Orlando and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Orlando, FL
	Tampa Area*	Clearwater, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Tampa, FL
GA	Atlanta Area	Atlanta and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Atlanta, GA
HI	Honolulu Area	Honolulu and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Honolulu, HI
IL	Chicago Area	Chicago and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Chicago, IL
IN	Indianapolis Area	Indianapolis and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Indianapolis, IN

State	Candidate Urban Area	Geographic Area Captured in the Data Count	Previously Designated Urban Areas Included
KY	Louisville Area*	Louisville and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Louisville, KY
LA	Baton Rouge Area*	Baton Rouge and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Baton Rouge, LA
	New Orleans Area	New Orleans and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	New Orleans, LA
MA	Boston Area	Boston, Cambridge, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Boston, MA
MD	Baltimore Area	Baltimore and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Baltimore, MD
MI	Detroit Area	Detroit, Sterling Heights, Warren, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Detroit, MI
MN	Twin Cities Area	Minneapolis, St. Paul, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined entity.	Minneapolis, MN; St. Paul, MN
MO	Kansas City Area	Independence, Kansas City (MO), Kansas City (KS), Olathe, Overland Park, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Kansas City, MO
	St. Louis Area	St. Louis and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	St. Louis, MO
NC	Charlotte Area	Charlotte and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Charlotte, NC
NE	Omaha Area*	Omaha and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Omaha, NE
NJ	Jersey City/Newark Area	Elizabeth, Jersey City, Newark, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Jersey City, NJ; Newark, NJ
NV	Las Vegas Area*	Las Vegas, North Las Vegas, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined entity.	Las Vegas, NV
NY	Buffalo Area*	Buffalo and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Buffalo, NY
	New York City Area	New York City, Yonkers, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	New York, NY
OH	Cincinnati Area	Cincinnati and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Cincinnati, OH
	Cleveland Area	Cleveland and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Cleveland, OH
	Columbus Area	Columbus and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Columbus, OH
	Toledo Area*	Oregon, Toledo, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Toledo, OH

State	Candidate Urban Area	Geographic Area Captured in the Data Count	Previously Designated Urban Areas Included
OK	Oklahoma City Area*	Norman, Oklahoma City, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Oklahoma City, OK
OR	Portland Area	Portland, Vancouver, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Portland, OR
PA	Philadelphia Area	Philadelphia and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Philadelphia, PA
	Pittsburgh Area	Pittsburgh and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Pittsburgh, PA
TN	Memphis Area	Memphis and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Memphis, TN
TX	Dallas/Fort Worth/Arlington Area	Arlington, Carrollton, Dallas, Fort Worth, Garland, Grand Prairie, Irving, Mesquite, Plano, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Dallas, TX; Fort Worth, TX; Arlington, TX
	Houston Area	Houston, Pasadena, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined entity.	Houston, TX
	San Antonio Area	San Antonio and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	San Antonio, TX
WA	Seattle Area	Seattle, Bellevue, and a 10-mile buffer extending from the border of the combined area.	Seattle, WA
WI	Milwaukee Area	Milwaukee and a 10-mile buffer extending from the city border.	Milwaukee, WI

*FY05 Urban Areas eligible for sustainment funding through the FY06 UASI program; any Urban Area not identified as eligible through the risk analysis process for two consecutive years will not be eligible for continued funding under the UASI program.

SOURCE: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/FY06_UASI_Eligibility_List.pdf

Identifying tomorrow's threats through today's research

Joint U.S. - Swedish workshop addresses future CIP challenges

On November 30th a workshop on "Critical Infrastructure Protection: Shared Functions - Shared Vulnerability," with special focus on Sweden and the United States, was held at George Mason University. The event was organized by Mason's CIP Program and Logos Technologies, of Arlington, VA, with the support of the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA). About 40 participants from the United States and Sweden took part in the discussions.

The workshop gathered experts on critical infrastructure protection (CIP) and Homeland Security to discuss current research agendas and future research priorities required to address knowledge gaps for the coming 5 to 15 years. As the risk and threat landscape of the 21st century are continuously evolving, new knowledge is needed to better understand how highly advanced technological societies such as the United States and Sweden can better protect their critical assets and respond to complex threats, while preserving their fundamental democratic values.

Highlights from the workshop's findings include the following:

- Which are the truly global aspects of CIP and, which are the critical and vulnerable nodes in our interdependent societies? The supply chain, with all its elements, was

acknowledged as a global conveyer belt and should be viewed as a global critical infrastructure. The Internet was also identified as a global critical infrastructure that supports, or facilitates, many critical functions in society.

- The catastrophic impact of the terrorist attacks on 9/11 may have pushed the U.S. into a too focused effort to prevent and respond to terrorism. Hurricane Katrina may be the wake-up call that will transform national priorities to a more balanced all-hazards approach to potential catastrophes.
- Safety precautions are perceived as a fact of life; however the dimension of security is often not integrated into many areas and functions of society. This may be a reflection of diverging interpretations over the fundamental question of how to define the range of threats and how finite resources should be allocated to produce the most effective responses. For example,

answers need to be provided to identify and prioritize targets most in need of hardening. Is government spending being allocated on the appropriate response measures or on response and recovery measures?

- It is vital to involve the business community in the decision making process on CIP as it owns and/or runs much (85 percent) of what is defined as critical infrastructure in the U.S.
- Are societies overspending to protect their critical infrastructure? Such overreaction, if true, is precisely what the terrorist adversaries seek to *(Continued, Page 12)*



Pictured above are: Jan Lundberg (Swedish Emergency Management Agency), Joshua Sinai (Logos), John McCarthy (CIPP), Jesper Grönvall (Swedish Institute of International Affairs), Bengt Sundelius (Swedish National Defense College)



Critical Infrastructure Resilience/ISBE 2006

Ensuring the Reliable Operation of the Nation's Critical Infrastructure

Washington Convention Center, February 15 - 17, 2006

John McCarthy Participates in Infrastructure Conference and
CIP Program Exhibits Research Findings and Projects:
February 15-17, 2006

The CIP Program will participate in a three-day conference on critical infrastructure protection, entitled **Critical Infrastructure Resilience / ISBE 2006**. This conference will be held at the Washington, D.C. Convention Center from February 15-17, 2006. At the conference, CIP Program Director and Principal Investigator, John A. McCarthy will participate in a panel discussion on Day 2 from 3:45 - 5:15pm on:

"The Current and Future Infrastructure: How Can Integration Be Achieved?"

In addition, the CIP Program will be an exhibitor in an exhibit hall at the conference, Booth 718. Here, CIP Program researchers will discuss past and future research, and CIP Program staff will also be on hand to discuss questions and research involving infrastructure protection.

Please Visit CIPP's website at <http://cipp.gmu.edu/> or the conference's website at <http://www.protectinfrastructure.com/index.html> for more information. If interested, Amy Cobb has limited quantities of expo passes available. Please contact her at acobb1@gmu.edu or 703-993-8193.



"Critical Infrastructure Protection: Shared Functions, Shared Vulnerabilities"
Workshop Participants

U.S. - Swedish (Cont. from Page 10)
achieve. We should therefore calibrate our response to the terrorist threat by identifying, assessing and prioritizing the sectors according to the greatest risk.

- While governments have improved the security of their critical infrastructures, are there remaining gaps that need to be resolved between the public and the private sectors? For example, there are fundamental questions over which entity, public or private, has the responsibility for protecting

critical infrastructure, for continuity of functions, and liability when recovery systems fail.

- There is a need for a clearing house of ideas and technologies related to CIP. A transatlantic task force should be created with representation from the business community to identify and prioritize the most important future technologies for CIP.

The complete report of the workshop's findings will be published on the CIPP website <http://cipp.gmu.edu>. ❖

The CIP Program is directed by John A. McCarthy, a member of the faculty at George Mason University School of Law. The CIP Program works in conjunction with James Madison University and seeks to fully integrate the disciplines of law, policy, and technology for enhancing the security of cyber-networks, physical systems and economic processes supporting the nation's critical infrastructure. The CIP Program is funded by a grant from The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

The CIP Report is published by Zeichner Risk Analytics, LLC on behalf of the CIP Program. ZRA is the leading provider of risk and security governance knowledge for senior business and government professionals. ZRA's vision is to be a consistent and reliable source of strategic and operational intelligence to support core business processes, functions, and assurance goals.

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