

Critical Infrastructure Protection in the National Capital Region

**Risk-Based Foundations for Resilience and
Sustainability**

**Final Report, Volume 14:
Critical Infrastructure: Citizens' Views of
Protection in the National Capital Region**
A Summary of the Citizen Panel on Critical Infrastructure
Protection, Vulnerability and Public Confidence

September 2005

University Consortium for Infrastructure Protection

Managed by the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program
School of Law
George Mason University

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Final Report, Volume 14: Critical Infrastructure: Citizens' Views of Protection in the National Capital Region

A Summary of the Citizen Panel on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
Vulnerability and Public Confidence

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September 2005

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– Notice –

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Critical Infrastructure:
Citizens' Views of Protection in the National Capital Region

A Summary of the
Citizen Panel on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
Vulnerability and Public Confidence

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1. Executive Summary

In the three and one-half years since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has made significant progress in protecting against, mitigating and responding to likely future threats or their analogues in the form of large scale natural disasters or industrial accidents. However, that progress has been uneven, with air transportation, airports, threat identification databases and first responders gaining much of the political and policymaking attention. Further, what progress has occurred has been accompanied by considerable controversy – from civil libertarians, community groups and average citizens, albeit to varying degrees.

Given these issues, it seems important to understand citizen preferences and confidence in critical infrastructure protection. This understanding seems especially important given the nature of the National Capital Region (NCR). With the public's support for and understanding of far-reaching policy changes critical to the actual success – or failure – of such initiatives, this study employs the policy analysis tool known as a *citizens' panel* to capture data and information beyond that which is available through random scientific surveys or focus groups which often study a specific response to policy and can limit the framework of the program. While our project makes reference to and appreciates the utility of public opinion polls, these instruments fail to capture citizens' true preferences and value orientations because most people lack the kind of detailed information required to make informed choices and tradeoffs.

The *Citizens' Panel on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vulnerability and Public Confidence* took place on the weekend of November 5, 2004. The panel constituted for this study included 18 adults selected to correspond the demographics of the Washington DC Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area. The panel was able to interact with experts, hear presentations and discuss information concerning disaster response, terrorism and critical infrastructure protection in the NCR. It then deliberated, making informed assessments and considering tradeoffs. The strength of the citizens' panel process is that it provides researchers information on the process by which citizens' make choices and it serves to enlighten citizens about a complex policy area while allowing them to be active stakeholders.

The findings of our initial survey to the panel show unsurprisingly that the panel members were deeply affected by the attacks on September 11. The members of our panel seem relatively well prepared for natural disasters yet continued to be worried about more terrorist attacks on the

regions. However deeper discussions among panel members seemed to coalesce around three major issues that the members' saw as critical to the public during a disaster.

The Three Key Issues:

- (1) *Government should conduct better community outreach*, particularly in the form of credible and useful information directed to citizens, to improve the public's confidence in homeland security. Panel members felt that the government was not communicating effectively at the local community level and therefore community input was being left out of the policy discussion.
- (2) *Government should communicate more clearly communication of issues about terrorism and homeland security*, with the very complexities of policy requiring more direct and localized initiatives.
- (3) *Government should de-politicize security issues*, because citizens currently perceive the substance and timing of security alerts as being politicized at the national level; such matters should be placed into the hands of more neutral actors. Specifically the panel supported what they called 'boots on the ground' types rather than political managers. A recurring theme in the recommendations phase of deliberations was that government needed to do more outreach on localized levels.

2. Introduction

September 11, 2001 showed the vulnerability of the United States to terrorist attacks. The US-Canada blackout and Hurricane Isabel in August and September of 2003, and more recently Hurricane Katrina reinforced public concerns regarding the susceptibility of key systems to disruption and helped to remind us that vulnerability comes in many forms. The US government has reacted swiftly and directed enormous human capital and financial resources to find ways to shore up the nation's capacity to anticipate, prevent, respond to and recover from future mass disruption events. Though Hurricane Katrina has cast some doubt on the governments ability to respond in a disaster event.

While we have made notable strides towards improving security and increasing protection of sensitive facilities, progress is slow and in a number of areas, agreeing on what to do has been difficult to achieve. Although the Department of Homeland Security has been successful on some fronts, it has been dogged by difficulties on others: securing chemical plants, ports, shipments of hazardous materials by train and truck, and the like. In addition, the Patriot Act, which was created to put the country on a new footing to deal with terrorism, has run afoul of civil libertarians who criticize the new law as too intrusive, endangering due process and equal protection requirements.

Interagency, intra-agency and inter-jurisdictional coordination remains a problem. While emergency services for natural disasters have a long history of effective operation, newly recognized interdependencies among systems, such as between electricity and telecommunications, and between electricity and water supplies, make problems more complex and difficult than in the past. Finally, signs that the public lacks confidence in some of the organizations that make up the homeland security framework bode ill for citizen compliance with directives authorities will need to issue in the event of another major attack on US soil.

Citizens' preferences for dealing with critical infrastructure so far have little direct place in these debates. Experts, policymakers and Congress are currently the main players in homeland security and critical infrastructure protection discussions.¹ Although experts are the most appropriate people to solve homeland security and infrastructure protection problems, views expressed by citizens should neither be discounted nor ignored, for it is they who will bear the costs and suffer the consequences of policy decisions. The citizen's support for far-reaching policy changes will be essential for their success, particularly if new policies require substantial adjustments to the way people live their lives.

A variety of tools can help policy analysts gauge public sentiment. Opinion polls, sample surveys and focus groups can of course be used to reveal citizen attitudes. But polls fail to capture citizens' true preferences and value orientations because they ask people for responses without the opportunity to do more than react to questions, without permitting citizen inquiry or discussion. Most people lack the kind of detailed information needed to make reasoned choices and tradeoffs on complex issues like Homeland Security. Furthermore, well-structured yet open

dialogue among citizens can more closely approximate “real” community interaction that is a powerful force in shaping people’s attitudes, beliefs and understandings.

To address this problem, we decided to make use of a policy analysis innovation known as a *citizens' panel*. A citizens' panel is a public meeting that allows ordinary citizens to be involved in assessing an issue. A sample of citizens is selected to participate. The process begins with presentations from technical experts, to whom the panel members may ask follow-up questions. The panel then meets in private to discuss the issues presented and to express and refine their personal views, facilitated by a neutral discussion manager. A report detailing the views and recommendations of the panel is produced at the end of the conference.

This report is a product of that process.

The goal of this process was to examine the following questions:

- How robust or vulnerable do citizens perceive infrastructures are in their communities?
- How do citizens view the consequences or costs of infrastructure disruption?
- How much would people be willing to pay for uninterrupted operation of such infrastructures?
- Who should bear the burden of assuring that services are reliable: private infrastructure operators, regulatory agencies, domestic security organizations or perhaps some other organization?
- What is the degree of confidence the public has in government agencies at the Federal, state and local levels to provide protective and security services?
- To what extent, if any, should civil liberties, be relinquished to assure system security?

Answers to these and other questions are the foundation of this project and report.

3. Goals and Objectives

The goal of the citizen's panel is three-fold. The first is to *gain a better understanding of how citizens view their own vulnerability to extreme events and their dependence on essential services* such as electricity, water, telecommunications, transportation and the like. Information derived from a citizens' panel can be used to help inform public institutions and service providers about public attitudes so that they can respond more effectively to public needs in the event of a major disruptive event. This could encompass not only citizen needs during and after the event but also how best to support citizens prior to the occurrence of a disaster event.

Public trust is critical in homeland security policy. Thus, the second goal of the citizens' panel is to *help both public institutions and service providers better understand which actions and policies foster public distrust and lack of confidence, and conversely, actions that they might take to restore and increase public trust. The citizens' panel process should provide an unfiltered analysis of citizen preferences not as uninformed voters but as informed active citizens in the policy process. Such gatherings could help experts and policy-makers craft policy to better serve citizen needs better than existing processes.* National security is no longer the province of well-organized and highly trained military and intelligence forces. Securing the homeland now involves dealing with a wide range of threats and events where everyone is potentially a target and where larger classes of actors are possible responders. Ensuring that the institutions tasked with providing leadership and coordination for national security has the highest possible confidence of the public is critical to any effective action.

The third goal of the citizens' panel is to *refine and expand a potentially useful methodology for involving the public in deliberative policy analysis.* This type of policy analysis has become increasingly important in addressing complex policy issues. Such approaches, though not entirely new, are not as widely used and stand in contrast to approaches that stress value-free studies of objective facts, where cost-benefit or probabilistic analyses are used to narrow options or identify “best” choices. The citizens' panel model may help policy-makers to better articulate citizen opinions and choices in the future.

Deliberative methods are more appropriate where difficult questions of social, political or moral values are at stake, and where the creation of meaning out of community processes is in itself a part of the phenomenon involved. Deliberative methods like the citizens' panel process ensure that citizens have adequate time and information to respond to specific policy choices. Through this method policymakers and researchers can then delve into the deeper attitudes that are involved in the decision-making process. Assessing the public's sense of vulnerability to extreme events, whether natural or man-made, and society's dependence on critical systems, the operating responsibility for most of which are held by private sector organizations, lends itself particularly well to deliberative techniques.

With these goals in mind, we formulated the following objectives:


1. Clarify some of the characteristics and impact of different types of serious disruptions or extreme events.

2. Describe to what extent and in which ways citizens feel vulnerable to extreme events and how prepared they feel in responding to them.
3. Describe and measure citizens' confidence in providers of infrastructure services and public security.
4. Articulate citizens' understandings and core values about the risks associated with homeland security.
5. Identify citizens' awareness of the tradeoffs in infrastructure services, security, costs and civil liberties.
6. Identify what citizens believe institutions providing essential services and security should do to be worthy of public trust and confidence, particularly during extreme events.


4. Findings

4.1 Impact of Disruptive Events to Community and Individual


Based on data from the initial survey we concluded that panelists had substantial experience with disruptive events both natural and terrorist in the past three years. Seventy two percent of panelists felt that the September 11th attack was the either very or somewhat disruptive to their work and daily lives. Both the area's winter storm shutdowns and the sniper shootings in October 2002 were seen as very or somewhat disruptive by 50 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, the anthrax letter attacks were not as disruptive as the others: only 23 percent of panelists were very or somewhat disrupted by that event.



In general, individuals said they were less affected personally by disruptive events than their communities. Over three quarters of the panelists felt that the Washington area sniper shootings, September 11th, and winter storm shutdowns were very or somewhat disruptive to their communities. Hurricane Isabel was close behind, with two-thirds experiencing it as either very or somewhat disruptive.





The most interesting finding with respect to the impact of various types of events is that a substantial number of panelists felt that their lives had changed as a consequence of September 11th. Fifty-six percent felt that their lives had either significantly or somewhat changed. A substantially smaller number said their lives had changed because of other events in the survey. This suggests that though citizens felt that the community at large had been affected, the average citizen-respondent did not seem as affected. This seems to show a larger psychological community impact not felt by individuals in deliberation.




4.2 Citizen Vulnerability and Preparedness

Panelists feel prepared to deal with some kinds of disruptions, but not others. All panelists predictably felt prepared for severe weather, a common occurrence in this region. Nearly three quarters say that they are either well or somewhat prepared to deal with an attack on a public place and two thirds feel they are prepared to deal with an attack on a transportation system, reflecting the feeling that relatively small numbers would be affected by such an event or that they could avoid it after it happened. But the great majority of panelists felt unprepared to deal with terrorist attacks involving hazardous materials – *e.g.*, a toxic release from a nearby chemical facility, biological agents or nuclear-radiological attack (“dirty bomb”). Only six percent felt at all prepared for a nuclear weapons attack.



On the other hand, between three quarters and four fifths of panelists have some emergency supplies on hand, such as battery powered radios, and actually know where they are in their homes. A majority, fifty-six percent, has emergency medical kits and supplies of water for three

days. However, only about a third of the panel members have a specific emergency response plan to communicate, meet family members or evacuate from the area should that be necessary. Panelists seem to have been prepared for “normal crises,” but that the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the post-9/11 preparedness information had not significantly prepared citizens for mass-terror crises. Few panelists had begun to move even to a planning stage.



Panelists feel a looming sense of vulnerability about future terrorist attacks, and believe that the Washington region is a target. Over three quarters believe that there will be another terrorist attack in the United States in the next few months, and think it is very or somewhat likely it will occur in the Washington region. Half the panelists worry that they or someone in their families will be a victim of such an attack. Half feel that it makes no difference whether the attack originates outside the United States.

About two-thirds of panelists were very or somewhat worried about suicide bombings, attacks on transportation systems, truck or car bombs, bio-terrorism, and chemical weapons. About the same proportion believe that such attacks are likely. About 40 percent were worried about nuclear explosions or bombs in shipping containers, but most felt such attacks were unlikely.

	How worried are you about the following types of attacks		Likelihood of an attack happening in the next year	
	Worried	Not Worried	Likely	Not Likely
Suicide bomber	72%	22%	67%	28%
Bomb in public place	67%	33%	67%	33%
Attack on transportation system	72%	28%	72%	28%
Truck or car bomb	67%	33%	67%	33%
Bioterrorism	72%	28%	56%	44%
Chemical weapons	67%	33%	61%	39%
Airplane as weapon	56%	44%	56%	44%
Attack on hazmat facility	56%	44%	50%	50%
"Dirty Bomb"	61%	39%	44%	56%
Cyber-terrorism	44%	56%	33%	67%
Bomb in shipping container	33%	67%	33%	67%
Nuclear explosion	39%	61%	17%	83%

Asked in a different way, about two-thirds of panelists were most worried about, and thought most likely that terrorist attacks would be conducted against subway and train systems and public places like stadiums. Just over half, between 56 and 61 percent, worried and thought likely that terrorist attacks would take place against schools, stores, office buildings, power and water facilities and airports or airplanes. Over from three fifths to two-thirds of the panel members did not worry about attacks against buses, harbors, highways or apartment buildings. The findings suggest an immediacy correlation to the perceived threat. There was a parallel between the fear of an attack and a feeling that this threat was immanent.


	How worried are you about the following specific targets being attacked by terrorists?		How likely is it that the following specific targets will be attacked by terrorists in the next year or so?	
	Worried	Not Worried	Likely	Not Likely
Subway systems	72%	28%	72%	22%
Trains	72%	28%	61%	39%
Public place/stadium	67%	33%	61%	39%
Schools	56%	44%	50%	50%
Office building	61%	39%	50%	50%
Retail establishments	61%	39%	56%	39%
Power plants	56%	44%	56%	44%
Water facilities	56%	44%	44%	56%
Airports/airplanes	56%	44%	44%	56%
Chemical plants	39%	56%	33%	67%
Bridges	61%	39%	50%	50%
Buses	39%	61%	44%	56%
Harbors/Ports	39%	61%	33%	67%
Highways	22%	78%	33%	67%
Apartment buildings	17%	83%	11%	83%

4.3 Citizen Confidence in Public Infrastructure and Security

In a key section of the survey, panelists were queried on their degree of confidence that critical infrastructure services would still be available to them in the event of a major local crisis, including but not only a terrorist attack. They were also asked to tell how dependent they felt they were on these services by indicating how long a service could be interrupted before they began to feel a hardship. Finally, panelists were asked to estimate how much more money, over and above their normal monthly expenditures, they would be willing to spend to keep the services functioning. The results are given in the chart below.

In general, panelists were most confident about and dependent on their water supplies and on radio. In particular, panelists said they would pay substantially more, on average, for water and electricity services to be reliably provided, followed by gas for home, highways and public transportation. In these four cases, over 50 percent of the panelists would be willing to pay either somewhat, a good deal or twice as much or more.

At the other extreme, members saw Cable TV as low on the dependency-reliability index. Panelists were also not willing to pay much to keep cable television functioning, along with postal services and local broadcast television. Telecommunications services, including, mobile and Internet-based, and banking services fell between these extremes.




In order to gauge the degree of confidence panelists have in the ability of government to function effectively in the face of major disruptions and terrorist attacks, the panelists were surveyed on several aspects of trust and confidence. They were asked initially how much they trusted the government in Washington to do the right thing (a standard question included in public opinion research) in order to establish a baseline of attitudes about confidence in general. On a scale from zero to 100 percent trust in government, the panel average was 46.3 percent, about the recent US national average of 40 percent.²


Panelists had somewhat less confidence in the ability of their governments to protect them from any future terrorist attack: 44 percent felt they had a great deal or a good amount of confidence in the US federal government to prevent an attack. The number fell to 33 percent for state government, and only 28 percent for local government. However, citizens felt a great deal of confidence in the US federal government to help them recover from an attack. Levels of confidence declined a bit for state and local government, despite the fact that they conduct most recovery efforts, rather than the federal government.

² Mackenzie, G. Calvin and Judith M. Labiner, "Opportunity Lost: The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11," Center for Public Service, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, May 30, 2002, p. 3.

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the government to prevent further terrorist attacks?



How much confidence do you have in the ability of the government to recover from terrorist attacks?



Panelists felt generally satisfied with the amount of spending on homeland security: 56 percent felt current levels of spending are about right, while 28 percent felt they are too high, and 17 percent that they are too low. However, about 60 percent of the panel members felt that they were not being given enough information about homeland security initiatives or about possible attacks. The strength of this sentiment grew over the course of the three days the panel met.

This dissatisfaction was the most pronounced with respect to the government color-coded alert system: forty-four percent found it not at all useful, and 28 percent found it not too useful, for a combined total of 72 percent limited or no utility. Only twenty-eight percent found it very or somewhat useful.

The panel was also polled on where members thought the government should put the most emphasis in the disaster process, with choices being (a) mitigation or minimizing vulnerabilities, (b) prevention of disruption, (c) preparedness in the event of a disruption, (d) maintaining operations during an major event, (e) responding effectively once a disruption has occurred, and (f) recovery and returning communities to normal functioning. Disaster scholars and professionals have developed this terminology to standardize disaster analysis and management although it is poorly understood and subject to endless debate.

In general, panelists wished to see government prevent terrorist acts from taking place, and then being prepared to respond. Mitigation or minimizing vulnerabilities was the third highest priority, followed by effective response once an incident or attack has occurred. Keeping systems functioning in the face of a continuing disruption and final recovery once the attack is over was the lowest priority for the panelists.


What should the government focus on more with respect to the following items with respect to both natural disasters and terrorist attacks?

	Top 2	Middle 2	Bottom 2	First rank	Second rank	Third rank	Fourth rank	Fifth rank	Sixth rank	Average
Prevention	67%	22%	11%	44%	22%	22%	0%	11%	0%	2.1
Preparedness	33%	67%	0%	22%	11%	39%	28%	0%	0%	2.6
Mitigation	44%	22%	29%	17%	28%	11%	11%	0%	29%	3.4
Response	28%	33%	39%	0%	28%	6%	28%	39%	0%	3.8
Reliability	0%	67%	34%	0%	0%	11%	56%	22%	12%	4.3
Recovery	17%	28%	58%	17%	0%	11%	17%	17%	41%	4.5

7.4 Citizen Awareness of Tradeoffs

Panelists were finally surveyed on their opinions concerning types of law enforcement intended to apprehend suspected terrorists. National ID cards and document checks were largely favored by the panelists: 61 percent favor ID cards and 72 percent favor document checks, with none opposed, though 28 percent were not sure. Bank activity monitoring also was generally supported, with 50 percent in favor, and 22 percent opposed. But monitoring at a distance was less supported by the panelists: 50 percent opposed law enforcement activities to monitor Internet chat rooms or to monitor public places with cameras. Opinion was divided on whether undercover police activity was favored: a plurality of 39 percent was not sure whether this was a

good idea. The panel was for the most part opposed to law enforcement intercept of electronic communications, with 78 percent opposed, 11 percent in favor, and 11 percent not sure.



4.5 Citizen Issues and Recommendation

Discussions of public confidence in institutions, both in government and critical service providers, took up the most of the panel’s time. After the initial survey and access to expert presentations panelists had numerous ideas about how government and the private sector operators could improve public trust and confidence. In this section the research team presents the findings and general recommendations of the deliberative portion of the panel process.

Comments focused on the *process* or *style* of communication, and on the *substance of homeland security issues*, suggesting that homeland security information conveyed by political figures in Washington tends to incur distrust, whereas local emergency management and law enforcement with “boots on the ground” are much more effective in getting credible information to the public and are much more trusted by them. The panelists also expressed a deep desire to be involved in community response and recovery, affirming the notion that people feel helpless in the face of extreme events and are eager to overcome such feelings in any way they can. More detailed discussion of the major themes follows in the section below. The discussions and recommendations focused on three key issues:

1. Community outreach
2. General communication of issues
3. Politicization of security issues

Community outreach was a major concern of many panelists. Many panelists had specific recommendations for policymakers. The focus of the concern seemed to be the lack of information directed to citizens. Though information was available the complexity of the issue seemed to indicate that more direct, informative and localized initiatives were needed. Clearly the information currently being provided was insufficient for the panel members and, given the issues regarding DHS' "color codes" information was seen as unhelpful. Others felt that government was not doing enough outreach to less fortunate members of society.

Panelists overwhelmingly wanted authorities to provide more reliable, specific information. Government is seen as not being honest or forthcoming and is suspected by many as politicizing homeland security information especially at the national level. The color code threat system was often mentioned as a political tool to heighten fears for the benefit of the current administration.

A few examples of statements from the panel meeting show that the panelists were clear about why such interaction was important to them:

- *[Public authorities need to] understand that people feel vulnerable because of the lack of and/or poor quality of the information they're given.*
- *[They need to] communicate effectively with people in the event of a disaster so that we can be more organized, knowledgeable, and directed in the steps we take to fix after it has happened, or even during [a disaster or extreme event].*
- *Community involvement and interaction is important. This concern is not opportunistic whining – it can be a valuable view tempered by living in a free market economy. Public service providers should have community meetings to explain disasters of all kinds and how to prepare for them, and they should respect what the public has to say.*

The desire for more frequent and better methods of communication between authorities and the public was more than just a generalized need. The panel came up with some concrete suggestions about how to go about this:

- Public authorities should make efforts to provide more immediate public information such as dedicated websites and public signs in high traffic areas.
- Effective immediate communications to individuals should be made using telephone, the Internet and cell phone along with increased use of radio and TV.
- In local areas, panelists urged that communities have local plans and initiatives along with more efforts at a local level to provide education regarding emergency procedures and vulnerabilities.

There was a great deal of impassioned discussion, even anger, around the argument that the government should de-politicize public safety. Panelists seemed willing to accept "bad news" and tradeoffs more readily if the messenger is a neutral analyst as opposed to a political figure.

This attitude was evidenced in response to the presentation by the FBI. The grim story told by the FBI representatives greatly reassured the panelists. The lack of trust in government seemed to be focused on higher ranks, while the panelists trusted “boots on the ground” types. There was more trust at local levels and individuals who led similar daily lives to the panelists than larger national figures. This suggests that the public safety issue is a personal one to the panelists, and one that is not responsive to national initiatives but needs a more locally recognizable and credible reassurance.

Panelists’ suggestions here were similar to their suggestions regarding effective communication. They saw a need for more “straight talk.” They were not impressed with what they called “feel good” measures such as the color coding scheme and wanted real and effective policy responses instead. A recurring theme for panelists throughout their deliberations was that government needed to do more outreach on a local level.

5. In Their Own Words

On community outreach

[Government agencies should] put themselves in average citizens' positions.

[Public authorities should] assess individual vulnerabilities on a local level (cavass, surveys, register respirators, etc.)

Have open communications between public institutions to do what is best for people.

[Government should] develop government-citizen partnerships.

[Public authorities need to] understand that people feel vulnerable because of the lack of and/or poor quality of the information they're given.

[Government needs to] communicate effectively with people in the event of a disaster so that we can be more organized, knowledgeable, and directed in the steps we take to fix after it has happened, or even during [a disaster or extreme event].

Community involvement and interaction is important. This concern is not opportunistic whining – it can be a valuable view tempered by living in a free market economy. Public service providers should have community meetings to explain disasters of all kinds and how to prepare for them, and they should respect what the public has to say.

Experienced personnel should live in the area to help citizens cope with an attack.

On the public's need for reliable, specific information and open communication

[We need] honest information about events: what, where, when as soon as possible.

[Public authorities should] provide immediate public communication – dedicated website; signs on roads/public transport, other public signs (like Times Square?).

[It should] assure effective communication system to individuals: telephone, internet, cell – and to the masses: radio/TV/papers.

On the need for grassroots education and involvement

[Government] should hold community meetings to “decentralize” preparation process to increase individual responsibility.... and through dialog with the government about the threats and how people will be affected.

[Public officials should] work with community activists, grassroots' coalitions, state and local health agencies to get a better understanding of the community (health-wise).

On de-politicizing public safety

[Citizen confidence could be improved] by not putting dollars at a higher priority than citizen lives.

... by creating non-partisan oversight committee to oversee security efforts (protecting civil liberties).

... by telling us the truth of what's happening rather than spinning every issue to suit partisan politics.

... by depoliticizing homeland security: managers over politicians.

All information should come from real sources like the FBI/CIA, etc. Not politicians! They only speak in their or their parties' interests.

Don't trust "politicians." Don't trust "media." Do trust "field officers." Let "field officers" talk to public.

Public institutions and providers must include the people by making knowledge available (straight talk)

Get out into the communities with displays and/or people at festivals, street fairs and other community events.

On the need for disaster plans and outreach

[Public authorities should] have disaster plans in order [and] to have a set of protocols to follow in case of attack.

Effort [should be] dedicated to education on a local level concerning emergency procedures and vulnerabilities.

[Public authorities need to] listen, reach out and communicate better with those on the fringes of society.

On mitigation and prevention

Begin with proactive measures – not just rehearsals, but mitigation... [Government should] decentralize assets, [provide] more redundancy.

On tradeoffs

Not everything can be protected; effective reaction is more important than attempting to protect everything.

[The government should] clarify differences between loss-of-life, emergencies, vulnerabilities and limited-time vulnerabilities (inconveniences), [and should do so] by talking to those people who do work on the frontlines as volunteers, (i.e. service clubs, food bank workers, etc.)

[In] establishing risk trade-offs, we do not accept compromise in life safety vs. cost of engineered mitigation.

On foreign policy and domestic threat of terrorism

[The United States government should] foster better international relations abroad to be safe at home.

On better follow-through on policy measures

[Public confidence would be improved] by instituting REAL safety measures, as opposed to worthless “feel-good” measures that are obviously useless.

Fix all of a problem; don't solicit help and then not follow through.

Release the bad news, disclose acceptable losses.

Downplay alarmist/sensationalist aspects and focus on aspects of systems that have proven to be reliable, stable, and successful.

6. Panel Methodology

This section describes the method by which the citizens' panel was constituted. One of the hallmarks of deliberative and participatory processes is a high degree of transparency in all aspects of the activity. Thus the project team has taken pains to explain its work in more detail than might usually be provided.

6.1 Recruitment of Panel Members

Over a period of four months, potential panelists were solicited, responses were analyzed, and members were selected for the panel. After a number of meetings, we decided to constitute a sample based on Washington Metropolitan region demographics. Previous panels in the United States and abroad had constituted panels with 12 to 18 members. We decided to form a panel of 18 members that would be representative of the demographics of the Washington metropolitan region rather than a random but highly representative sample. We use the term "satisfactorily representative" to signal to the reader that for the purposes of our exercise, highly representative panel construction would not in any meaningful way change the legitimacy of the process (For more on this issue, please refer to section 8: Potential Sources of Bias).

The reason for this decision was two-fold. First, one of the goals for this project was to have the process accessible to average citizens; no special knowledge or skills would be required. Second, we intended that the process should be easily replicated by other entities looking to increase community participation in policy areas. Not all community organizations will have the financial resources with which to conduct a random telephone survey with follow-up interviews to achieve a random representative sample. Finally, we felt that we could construct a satisfactorily representative sample through other means that would have an equal research value to one conducted through random digit dialing at a lower cost.

The first step in the process was to construct a "target" panel that would be satisfactorily representative. Using Washington DC Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area data from the 2000 US Census, a target panel was formulated based on demographic factors such as sex, education, income, ethnicity and type of occupation (please see Appendix B. for data on the target panel).

The next step in panel construction was panel recruitment. Based on the Danish consensus conference process, we decided to compensate panel members generously, to ensure that people would not suffer economically by participating. We set the compensation rate at \$750, or about \$30 per hour, which we judged was adequate to assume attendance for some types of professional and consulting work.

We employed a variety of methods to fill out the panel, given our need to keep the process replicable within budget constraints. These methods fall in one of four categories: organizational communication, electronic solicitation, print advertising, and face-to-face canvassing. Each method has both strengths and weaknesses. In order to preserve our objectivity and integrity of the selection process, we disqualified any applicants who were related to or had an existing

friendship with any member of the staff. In addition, staff members involved in the face-to-face canvassing of panelists were not allowed to take part in selecting the panel members from the list of applicants (for more detailed description regarding solicitation of panel members see Appendix C).

6.2 Recruiting Issues

There were a number of issues that made the recruitment process difficult. Many people refused to apply. Three common issues stand out across all four recruitment categories: scheduling conflict, issue complexity and selection criteria.

Scheduling Conflict

Of the interested individuals, a majority did not apply because of the length of the time commitment. The panel was initially scheduled for two weekends in November 2004. After a number of potential recruits expressed their difficulty with that schedule we decided to reduce the project to three days over one weekend. Although three full days of panel deliberation improved recruitment levels, the time commitment remained a problem for some individuals. We decided to keep the three-day schedule because anything less was simply not enough time to adequately complete the project. It should be noted that the problem did not arise in the length of time for the panel deliberations so much as that for many individuals had a schedule conflict for one of the three days of deliberation.

Issue Complexity

Many people were hesitant to apply because they did not sufficiently understand the meaning of critical infrastructure nor did they feel they could contribute in a positive way to the discussion.

Selection Criteria

As noted earlier a target panel was constructed based on census data for the Washington Metropolitan region. Unfortunately, even after extensive effort, we were unable to attract participants from certain groups, principally people of Hispanic origin, people with incomes above \$100,000 and people with low incomes.

The issue of income is difficult. Those with lower incomes seemed unwilling to participate because of time needed off from work, while those with higher incomes simply did not seem to want to waste their time: money was not the issue for this group.

The problem in recruiting members with Hispanic or Latino ethnicity was more a cultural. Many felt their English proficiency was inadequate to discuss the issue of the conference. Many Hispanics who did express interest, balked at serving as soon as our staff mentioned that we were funded by DHS. This seemed to indicate that they were afraid of immigration services though this was not specifically articulated

6.3 Panel Selection

Each interested party was asked to complete a short survey that included questions regarding basic demographics. These demographics covered denominators such as age, sex, race, income, education and job type (A copy of the screening questionnaire can be found in Appendix B). Initial invitations were sent to potential panel members with the focus on attaining a panel that was representative of the NCR region based on statistics provided by the Census Bureau. Applicants were selected in a series where an initial set of invites were sent based on randomly selecting persons with certain matching criteria. The remaining invitations were sent on the basis of fulfilling targets with selected criteria. Panel characteristics will be discussed in Section 7.1 of this report.

6.4 Expert presenter recruitment

In addition to a panel of citizens, we also needed a panel of experts to present and discuss the issues with the panelists over the course of the first two days of the activity. Expert presenters were recruited through professional contacts of the senior team member, Prof. Todd M. La Porte.

Professor Tricia Wachtendorf is affiliated with the Disaster Research Center (DRC) at the University of Delaware, the leading disaster research center in the United States. Contact was made with her through the senior research faculty members, Profs. Joann Nigg and Benigno Aguirre. Among other topics, Center research focuses on disaster myths and the empirical study of public response to disasters. Dr. Wachtendorf has conducted research and published in such areas as transnational disaster coordination, community-based approaches to disaster mitigation and partnership building, and multi-organizational responses to natural and terrorist induced disasters. Her research expertise was useful in explaining to panel members what typical public responses to extreme events, including terrorist attacks, and helped to establish the context for how the public was likely to be affected, both physically and psychologically, by such an event in our region.

Supervising Special Agent Jim Rice of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was recruited through direct contact with the FBI's Washington Field Office. Rice is the supervisor for the National Capital Response Squad, which is a special operations unit responsible for the coordination of all FBI crisis response capabilities within the National Capital region. His office is responsible for domestic terrorism incidents, bombing response and investigations, chemical/biological/radiological and nuclear-weapons matters and special event/crisis management issues for the national capital region.

Special Agent Glenn Cross, a counter-terrorism expert at FBI headquarters, was recruited through contact with Prof. La Porte at George Mason, where Agent Cross has been a student for several years. He is now a PhD candidate in a bio-defense program. Cross focuses on the threat posed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inside the US. Previously he has worked as an analyst on WMD nonproliferation and on Soviet strategic forces for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Rice and Cross were essential to explaining the government's perspective on the terrorism threat, the potential consequences of an attack, the nature and development of terrorist organizations, and the prevention and response activities of law enforcement agencies.

Michael Armstrong, vice president for emergency management at ICF Consulting and former associate director for mitigation at FEMA in the Clinton Administration, was recruited through contacts that Prof. La Porte has with senior managers at ICF, a well-established emergency management consulting practice. Armstrong's expertise in mitigation and community programs was helpful to the panel in explaining how mitigation programs can work to reduce the vulnerability of communities to disasters with appropriate long-term planning.

Professor. Fred Krimgold volunteered his services as an expert on critical infrastructures and interdependence through his involvement with the National Capital Region project on infrastructure vulnerability assessment practices. He is an associate professor in the College of Architecture and Urban Studies at Virginia Tech – Alexandria, and serves as co-director of the World Institute for Disaster Risk Management (DRM), a network of cooperating academic and professional institutions for applied research, implementation, and dissemination in the field. Krimgold has been actively involved in post-earthquake studies throughout the world. He has several projects underway that relate to protection of civilian populations from attack.

Professor Irene Leech was recruited through contact with Prof. Krimgold. She is an associate professor at Virginia Tech – Blacksburg, where she teaches consumer affairs. A consumer advocate, she currently serves as president of the Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, a state-wide, grass-roots organization. Among the issues she is currently working on at the state level are electric restructuring and telecommunications, and she has considerable experience with consumer issues arising from severe weather, including Hurricane Isabel in 2003.

6.5 Role and Methods of Facilitators

Expert Presentation

The role of the expert presenters was intended to put a strong factual framework around the citizens' panel discussions. The project team believed that without making this effort panelists would lack sufficient common knowledge or information that, in turn, might lead to unproductive dialogue.

In order to guide the panel's discussions for maximum openness and participation, and to prevent them from being dominated by particularly vocal panel members, the project team decided to engage two experienced group facilitators: Karen Curnow and Scott Brumbaugh, both acquaintances of Prof. Addleson. The project team leader met with both Curnow and Brumbaugh in the two weeks before the panel meeting to discuss how the facilitation would be conducted.

Collectively the study team and the facilitators decided that the facilitators would effectively lead the daily meetings in order to reduce the possibility of bias by team members, who might have a specific point of view on some of the issues the panel was to address. An annotated panel agenda served as a roadmap for the facilitators as they guided the meetings over the course of the

three days. They took as their primary mission the achievement of the goals enumerated on this agenda as well as the facilitation of group discussions that maximized the possibility of participation by all parties.

Further, we decided that the facilitators would solicit panel members, at natural break points, written feedback on the specific discussion topics. This was done to ascertain the extent to which panelists understood the issues, to learn their views in a private context rather than in public. These intermediate documents would also serve as valuable sources of data about the panelists' views, which could be analyzed later.

Nominal Group Technique

In the final phase of the panel, after the expert presentations had concluded, the panelists were to engage in general discussion and deliberation. The facilitators suggested the use of *nominal group technique*, an established method of conducting discussions that helps groups organize priorities. It relies on a combination of individual reflection and short-statement-writing, presenting these individual statements to a group, and then a simple group ranking or voting on priorities, usually via flip charts. The process is repeated until there is general agreement, though not necessarily consensus.

Nominal group technique is seen as an alternative to standard focus group methods, where the group dynamic is less important, and Delphi techniques, which are used to solicit specific expectations about the future, often from experts, in multiple rounds of rankings. The nominal group method is valuable for citizens' panel deliberation in that they are designed to maximize group participation, but not necessarily a group decision or consensus, as would be the case in a jury.

6.6 Role of the Evaluator

To assure ourselves and others that the citizens' panel processes were conducted with as little bias as possible, the project team invited Prof. Mark Addelson, director of the Program on Organization Development and Knowledge Management, to serve as an independent evaluator. Prof. Addelson attended some of the project planning sessions, and all of the citizens' panel meetings, to observe what took place. Prof. Addelson has written a brief commentary and evaluation.

6.7 Pre- and Post-panel surveys

The working group developed a pre-panel survey for the attending members. The survey was to focus on a number of issues (Please see Appendix E and F for complete copy of post and pre-panel surveys).

The purpose of the survey was to establish a means by which the citizens' panel process could be evaluated with respect to the larger community or the country as a whole. Though not originally intended to be used in this way, the survey became the basis for large-scale regional and national surveys. The adaptation of the original instrument to a large-scale survey has become the

foundation of a stand-alone project currently being researched by project staff. The comparison of the data from the deliberative project compared to the national and regional survey data should provide more detailed information on the value of the deliberative process in addition to larger data regarding public confidence in critical infrastructure protection.

A post-panel survey was also administered to evaluate member's views on the process itself. The anonymous survey was administered to ensure that the process was fair and balanced for the panel members in addition to an evaluation of the different modules.

6.8 Meeting logistics

Logistics with respect to organizing the actual conference were more complex than first realized. The administrative burden imposed by event management was large though manageable. The logistics of organizing a conference of this magnitude can be split into three areas:

1. Site Selection
2. Documentation
3. Equipment and Food

Site selection was organized based on firm dates set before the recruitment of the panel. Location and dates were not only important to panel recruitment but also needed to reserve meeting space early. George Mason University's School of Public Policy building in Arlington, Virginia provided us with maximum control and flexibility at a minimal cost. The location was also easily accessible via the metro system and major roads. The control and flexibility were important in ensuring that rooms were properly organized before each event day.

Being aware of all necessary documentation was as important as site selection. Central to the project was the provision of briefing papers to panel members and evaluation forms and the two surveys administered during the project. Separate from the research requirements was the administrative paperwork required by the University. This included financial paperwork; human consent forms, and other administrative requirements. All paperwork was organized prior to the start of the project and cleared through appropriate channels. Moreover, panel members and prospective invitees required constant correspondence and reminders on the importance of the project and therefore the importance of their attendance at the conference.

Recording equipment and audio/visual aids were requested in advance. Tape recorders were used in all of the conference areas in order to be able to review all breakout sessions in addition to plenary sessions. Food and beverages were also an integral part of the conference. Conference members were together for three days and the provision of two meals a day, snacks, and constant water and coffee kept the members fortified. Group breakfasts and lunches also provided a more social atmosphere in which panel members could talk with experts and with each other.

A professionally organized atmosphere was integral to the conference, as the project team was acutely aware that a well organized conference run under the aegis of an academic institution gives legitimacy and standing to the endeavor. Panel members seemed more willing to contribute and felt their statements had more impact given the professionalism of the conference.

6.9 Overview of meeting agenda and schedule as description of process

The NCR Citizens Panel took place on November 5, 6 and 7, 2004. The Friday-through-Sunday schedule was found to be a suitable compromise between the time needed to conduct a program of this kind and the need not to unduly burden panel members.

In order to manage deliberation and discussion among the panel members, we split the 3-day event into modules. The first two days focused on expert presentation followed by panel questions. The third day was spent on panel deliberation during which panel members presented their final opinions and recommendations (See Appendix G for complete schedule).

In addition, a number of breakout sessions were scheduled to allow subgroups of panelists to discuss the experts' findings without the experts present, allowing members to speak without feeling constrained by their presence. The breakout sessions also allowed panel members the opportunity to contemplate and discuss with other members the information presented to them by experts and flush out any issues they might have with regards to these presentations.

The expert presentations focused on four issues:

1. Scenarios and provocations: public and government behaviors in crises
2. Infrastructures and vulnerabilities
3. Public policies for critical infrastructure protection, emergency response
4. Tradeoffs: presentation on risks, costs, benefits, consequences, options

The first issue on the agenda was a discussion on public and government behavior in a crisis. Professor Wachtendorf focused her presentation on the difference between preconceived ideas of public response to disasters based on public opinion versus real public responses based on research. Often our notion is to believe what we see on TV, that panic is the public's first response to disaster. The disaster research community has shown in nearly every disaster situation that panic is not exhibited by affected groups. This was clearly shown during 9/11 as well. The one exception is when a crowd in a confined space can see a single exit. In such situations, stampedes and panic do occur. Dr. Tricia Wachtendorf presented this session.

The second issue presented to the panel was a description of the current level of infrastructure vulnerability in the United States. This session sought to provide the panel with expert opinions on threats to the NCR. This session was presented by Special Agent Jim Rice of the Washington Field Office of the FBI and Glenn Cross, a FBI analyst specializing in weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Both Special Agent Rice and Mr. Cross spoke about the ability of individuals and organizations to conduct terror attacks in an open society. Agent Rice was remarkably frank in discussing the ability of a person to conduct widespread damage in a short amount of time, and he asserted that terrorist attacks were likely. Mr. Cross argued that al-Qaeda as a group was evolving rapidly as it has been pursued by counterterrorist services, and that the organization's capacity to conduct attacks was not being diminished. Agent Rice was reassuring to the panel, in his insistence that

law enforcement was extremely professional and well-conducted, and that the FBI takes extremely seriously the protection of civil rights under the Constitution.

Public policies for critical infrastructure protection and emergency response was the third issue discussed at the citizens' panel. The focus of this session was to explore current government strategies and priorities for infrastructure protection. After exploring threats, and public responses the panel heard about possible strategies and responses to threats. The experts for this session were Dr. Fred Krimgold, who spoke primarily about critical infrastructure service interdependencies, and Mr. Michael Armstrong, the former FEMA official, who spoke about "disaster resistant communities," and current government thinking about national infrastructure protection plans.

The final informative session focused on tradeoffs and consumer issues. After the panel had heard been presented with information regarding threats, responses and strategies they were presented with an opportunity to examine the costs related to different strategies and options. This final session began the phase in the meeting in which members were asked to think about recommendations and the complexity of making decisions in this field. The questions in this final discussion, led by Dr. Irene Leech, were focused more on aftereffects of Hurricane Isabel and consumer issues that interested panel members.

7. Description of Events

As many battlefield planners have noted, plans can fall apart at the moment of contact. Many preconceived notions held by our staff were thrown away as the panel unfolded. Our diverse panel exceeded expectations in terms of initiative, participation, and level of understanding. The primary foci of panel members concerns were also different from our preconceived ideas. In this section we will describe the panel that was constituted and provide a narrative of the event.

7.1 Panel Characteristics

As noted in the table below, the citizens’ panel constituted a diverse group.

Gender		Location	
Female	10	MD	5
Male	8	VA	10
		DC	3
Age		Race/Ethnicity	
18-34	10	White	13
35-44	4	Black/African American	4
45-54	3	Asian	1
55-64	1	Hispanic	0
65+	0		
Education		Income	
Some HS	1	0-24	2
HS/GED	1	25-49	8
Some College	4	50-74	1
AD/BA	7	75-99	4
Grad	5	100+	3

The panel was relatively diverse and somewhat representative of the Washington DC area. Along with diversification in socio-economic status, members of the panel also came from both suburban and urban backgrounds and held a number of different jobs. The panel included a horse trainer, financial analyst, students, event organizers, non-profit workers, government employees. One member of the panel was unemployed. The table in Appendix B shows the difference between the targeted demographics and the actual makeup of the panel. Though all targets were not met, we felt that the diversity and makeup of the panel was satisfactory for the purposes of a citizens panel.

The members of the panel seemed to achieve group cohesiveness within the first day. One or two members of the panel served as lightning rods for discussion through the use of polemic. However, most members seemed to empathize and support each other. In terms of politics the group seemed united in having a more liberal political leaning. Though the question was not asked in the recruitment questionnaire it seemed that the panel had a very similar political viewpoint which may have framed some of the discussion.

7.2 Narrative of Panel Process

Gratifyingly, the citizens' panel members as a whole came to the process with the intention of participating in an open dialogue. However it should be noted that one member came to the panel with a preconceived view that he wished to have heard and did not return after the first day. As noted earlier, the panel members reached a degree openness in their discussion relatively early and seemed to form a cohesive group. The first day of the panel set the tone for the rest of the discussion.

Prof. Wachtendorf's presentation on public response to disasters was well received and was followed by a frank discussion on terrorism and threats from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction led by Mr. Rice and Mr. Cross. The panel, though presented with other crisis such as the sniper incident, seemed to focus remaining discussions on the threat of terrorism rather than other disasters. This discussion of terrorism and threats from terrorist activity continued to be the hot topic during the breakout sessions later in the day.

The second day the presentations were focused on allowing the citizen to begin thinking about tradeoffs and public policy. A main theme of discussion was a focus on issues of privacy and a focus on insurance. These areas dominated the discussion for the day. On the third day panel members were encouraged to spend the day thinking about priorities that policymakers should focus their attention.

Throughout the three days panel members seemed to feel that the panel was an opportunity not only for them to express their opinions as individuals, but also an opportunity for them to represent their community. Correspondingly there was increased discussion on the second day towards community response and community efforts rather than individual preparedness and tradeoffs.

8. Potential Sources of Bias

8.1 Potential Panel Bias

The process by which the panel was recruited and selected may be a potential source of bias. The panel was recruited through a number of sources, but many of the sources (i.e. print media, internet) have a bias towards members of the community with access to certain organizations and access to the Internet. This bias was mediated through face to face canvassing and the variety of organizations contacted. However, the panel was not recruited through a standard random selection. Instead panel members may have in effect self-selected for the project. This may introduce a strong interest bias to the panel. Those that have an interest in the issue may be overly represented.

Another potential criticism is that the panel suffers from a lack of diversity with regards to certain members of the NCR. As noted, though the recruiters made concerted efforts to attract these members of society, the panel lacks members of the Hispanic community and senior citizens. In addition questions regarding marriage were not asked. The panel had a higher representation of unmarried members than is actually reflected in society. In short there is a potential bias as the panel does not completely represent the actual statistical diversity found in the NCR region.

8.2 Potential Process Bias

In addition to potential bias in the citizen's panel itself, there may be a bias within the process. A potential bias may occur in the analysis of findings based on the process described within this report. Members may feel repressed due to dominant personalities and certain views may be overlooked. Moreover, facilitators and experts may lead the discussion towards framing viewpoints in ways so that the panel member feels constrained to agree to expert opinions. A further criticism or potential bias may be that in general, the process fosters consensus and group cohesiveness that may formulate recommendations and preferences based on group think rather than on individual preferences as noted through polling.

8.3 Possible Effects on Outcome

Each of these potential biases were examined and efforts were made to mitigate their effects. In terms of recruitment, after submitting a questionnaire stating interest panel members were then randomly selected by demographic criteria. Though the panel was not statistically representative of the NCR, every effort was made to make the panel a diverse and as satisfactorily (or sufficiently) representative of the area as possible. Regardless, the group that was constituted *can serve to represent* viewpoints from the area that has value in research. This is different from stating that this group represents the NCR region but has an equal value in terms of researching the groups concerns and preferences.

The potential process bias was mitigated in a number of ways. Pre and post panel surveys were administered along with evaluations of every session. The evaluations and surveys were

anonymously submitted and analyzed without attempting to confer or infer identity. These anonymous evaluations coupled with smaller breakout sessions allowed for a diversity of opinion to be expressed and discussed in an open environment. The facilitators asked less vocal members of the panel direct questions and those that were more effusive were asked to wait until others had their say. Diversity of opinion was encouraged by the facilitators. An open atmosphere was encouraged; after three days of close work, it seemed that open expression was the norm. Group think was further avoided through the use of the nominal group technique. Every effort was made to support inclusive and open discussion.

9. Conclusion

The citizens' panel is a valuable tool for studying, understanding and engaging citizens in complex and value-laden policy issues. Where public problems are infused with strong value or emotional content, processes such as this may be especially useful, because they depend not just on snapshots of uninformed public sentiment, but rely on thoughtful discussion and dialog, with expert information contributed to the process to educate but not dictate views to an average group of citizens. The process we developed is replicable, affordable, and useful in uncovering deep public concerns and views.

This particular panel on critical infrastructure protection, vulnerability and public confidence revealed strong concerns about terrorism and vulnerability. A large number of panelists said that their lives had changed as a consequence of 9/11, and large majorities felt another attack was likely.

The character and degree of communication between government authorities and the public was also an important concern. The public welcomes more open, direct communication about extreme events. While the public is worried about its security, and feels quite vulnerable to attacks, this panel says, government should not be afraid to tell it like it is. The public can handle bad news as long as it is honest and complete.

The panel hungered for more government involvement in communities and grassroots activities. Time after time members of the group said they saw a strong need for involvement of the government with community groups. The panel felt strongly that the government should listen to the average citizen and should develop plans and partnerships for emergency response with local governments and citizens' groups. This has been evidenced in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Government response whether adequate or not can be perceived as inadequate if the proper planning is not done at a community level. The perceived legitimacy of government ability in a disaster is linked to public confidence. Public confidence is earned at the local level and lost at the national level.

At the same time, the panelists distrusted government, particularly the agencies of homeland security. They felt that much information about domestic security and terrorism is politicized and therefore not credible. The group by far preferred to hear about terrorism threats and actions from people with boots on the ground, field operatives who they saw as not manipulating information about emergencies for political gain. While the group believed that some civil liberties might need to be curtailed to fight terrorism, they also did not want the pendulum to swing too far away from traditional civil liberties protections.

The sentiments regarding vulnerability to extreme events and confidence in government that surfaced in this panel were complex. The panel as a whole exhibited a palpable degree of anxiety about future terrorist attacks, and about the ability of public authorities to perform their functions in ways in which the public would approve. This lack of confidence, in our judgment, would

greatly hamper the ability of public authorities to mobilize and direct public response and activity in the event of another large-scale disruption or attack.

This is not just a question of public communication, though better communication would help: panelists highly valued straight talk and the honest truth. It is also the *behavior* of homeland security and critical infrastructure service which is at stake: panelists are saying that trustworthiness comes from sustained engagement and a wide array of non-politicized concrete actions (listening, planning, education and outreach) and at the local community level. Based on the panel deliberations, we believe that these are critical to improving the ability of the government authorities and critical infrastructure service providers to effectively execute their responsibilities in the eyes of the public.

While we are confident that this panel activity was conducted fairly and that its outcome is accurately reported, we also believe that in this sensitive area some views could change. The panel itself was not large enough to represent statistically the population as a whole on all dimensions. Thus we believe that further research on protection, vulnerability and confidence in institutions is warranted, and we are elsewhere engaged in conducting that research, through traditional public opinion survey methods. One outcome of that research is to produce easy-to-use indices on public vulnerability, public preparedness, and public confidence. We hope that further funding can be found to enable regular data collection so that performance over time can be tracked.

Additional citizens' panel activities would help to broaden the empirical base for evaluating the public's views as well. Different panels, at different times and in different places, would add substantially to our understanding of the public, and could furthermore be a powerful means to improve public understanding of the difficult issues emerging in homeland security.

We also aim to conduct more focused research on the perceptions of managers in homeland security and critical infrastructure organizations of the public's views of their activities; if there are significant differences in such perceptions then there may be cause for special concern about the ability of these organizations to engage with the public in times of extreme need.

10. Bibliography

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APPENDIX A: Citizens' Panel Methodology and Outcomes

The concept of public participation as a necessary condition for a democratic society is unarguable. Yet, direct public participation in many areas of public policy analysis is lacking. The representative system used within the US political system leaves most citizens one step removed from policy processes. Legislators and policy-makers within government often do not have the tools to access citizens' preferences on complex issues such as critical infrastructure protection. Direct involvement by citizens in the policy formulation process is typically limited to focus groups, which are usually comprised of citizens and whose charge is concerned with a specific policy area. Focus groups also tend to be more limited in terms of scope and length. Further, focus groups are generally interested in initial responses to initiatives rather than a deeper analysis of citizen intent. The typical public interaction with policy makers usually takes the form of an occasional letter or phone call to Congress or involvement with an interest group. More likely, public preferences are seen through prisms of large-scale polling and the occasional focus group.

The prevailing process limits citizen involvement in policy formulation to activists, their elected representatives, interests groups and the media. Access by the "average" citizen is limited, yet it is these citizens at large who must live with the policy outcomes. There is considerable evidence that these non-deliberative techniques fail to capture actual citizens' preferences and value orientations because citizens nearly always lack sufficient information to make reasoned choices and tradeoffs. The quality of democratic governance is adversely affected in such situations, leading citizens to disengage and withdraw support for public institutions and government's legitimacy.³

This research addresses the disjunction between experts, policymakers and citizens by means of a policy analysis innovation known as a *citizens' panel* or *consensus conference*, which are elements of *deliberative and inclusive processes in policy analysis and policymaking*.⁴

Deliberative Techniques and Citizen Conferences

Deliberative techniques of policy evaluation or technology assessment were originally developed in the United States in the late 1970s and early 1980s, principally in connection with health technology assessments at the National Institutes of Health.⁵

³ See Gastil (2000) ch. 2; Fishkin (1995).

⁴ See Wortman, Vonoker and Sechrest, 1988; Dürrenberger, Kastenholz and Behringer, 1991; Joss and Durant, 1995; Renn, Webler and Widemann, 1995; Bereano, 1997; Grin, van de Graaf and Hoppe, 1997; Guston, 1997; Anderson and Jaeger, 1999; Fischer, 1999; Hörning, 1999; Marris, 1999; Kluver, et al., 2000; Garvin, 2001; Hudspith, 2001. Similar approaches have been explored under the label "citizen jury" (Crosby, 1995; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Australian National University, 2000; Blamey, James and Smith, 2000; Neimeyer and Blamey, 2000; Abelson et al., 2001) or "town meeting" (Sclove, 1996).

⁵ The method of *expert consensus conferences* is now a common method for assessing new medical procedures or drug treatments. They were developed in the 1970s with the goal of establishing common criteria and guidelines on

Somewhat later, political theorists such as James Fishkin of the University of Texas began to experiment with *deliberative polling*, wherein they sought to improve the process of identifying citizens' preferences by engaging them in dialogue on a wide variety of issues.⁶ These techniques were first used in environmental policymaking at the community level.⁷

Worldwide, the use of citizen's panel conference has garnered more support than it has in the United States. The process used for this project was developed and institutionalized by the Danish Board of Technology to study and make decisions regarding the impact of technological innovations.⁸ The Danish Board of Technology recruits a representative selection of citizens from around the country, informs them broadly about a policy topic, and invites them to come to a consensus about the implications of this new policy topic. Topics for 2002 included "Gene modification and the Third World," "How can we assign value to the environment?" and the "Electronic Patient Journal." Conference conclusions are reported to the Danish Parliament, and widely distributed to the public.

The Danish have expanded their methodological toolkit and currently use a number of different models to "place an emphasis on the versatility of their methods."⁹ These models differ depending on the topic, the selection of participants and the organization of the discussion. The consensus conference aims to "promote a dialogue" and provide a more direct access to the government.¹⁰ The conference is usually attended by members of the Danish Parliament, and the Board of Technology is charged by the Parliament to support public debate on technology.¹¹

The essential parts of the conference are the citizens' panel, the experts' panel and the advisory/planning committee.¹² The experts' panel refines the policy topic and provides expert analysis to the citizens' panel. The citizens' panel is the lead actor in the Danish model. The panel is provided with information before the conference and works together to formulate questions prior to the conference.¹³ The panel then provides recommendations. The process works much like the deliberations of a jury but is much more interactive.

The Danish model has been exported to other nations, not only to neighboring countries such as the Netherlands but as far as Australia, where the focus has primarily been on environmental issues.¹⁴ Although most countries follow the Danish model, they lack the strong public-

a particular therapy that is still controversial. For a discussion of the legitimacy and effectiveness of these conferences, see e.g. Wortman, Vonoker, and Sechrest (1988).

⁶ Fishkin (1995) reports on his experiments with deliberative polling in United Kingdom and with the National Issues Forum, both large-scale televised efforts to bring randomly selected citizens together to discuss and recommend policies to government.

⁷ Holmes and Scoones (2000) provide an excellent overview. See also Dietz and Stern (1998).

⁸ Hudspith, 2001; Guston, 1998; Sclove 1996.

⁹ Danish Board of Technology: <http://www.tekno.dk/subpage.php3?survey=16&language=uk>. Accessed January 22, 2004.

¹⁰ Anderson and Jaeger, 1999.

¹¹ Guston, 1998.

¹² Anderson and Jaeger, 1999.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ James and Blamey, 2000

government link that the Danish model has institutionalized with direct links to the Parliament; in other countries the link is not so developed.¹⁵

As noted earlier, the origins of the citizens' conference in the United States developed within the National Institutes of Health. However, in the United States the institutionalization of the citizens' conference concept has not taken hold. The use of citizens' panels within the US is relatively low compared to that of other countries. To date, the scope of citizen conferences have been focused towards technology and environment and have been used only sparingly in other policy arenas. Broad use of citizens' conference processes has yet to take hold in America due to their novelty, which has so far led to a lack of real impact on public policy or active support from government.¹⁶

It was not until April 1997 that one of the first consensus conferences was held in the United States, "The Citizens Panel on Telecommunications and the Future of Democracy." The conference was organized by the Loka Institute,¹⁷ the Massachusetts foundation for the Humanities, the Education for Public Inquiry and International Citizenship at Tufts University, Technology Review Magazine and the University of Massachusetts extension.

A separate but related initiative called the *Citizens Jury* was begun in 1974 with modest success.¹⁸ The Citizens Jury process is based on the common law legal system, in which 12 members of a "jury" are given a charge and listen to testimony from various experts on a given issue. Issues range in policy areas that include the environment, taxes, and physician assisted suicide. The Citizens Jury is the longest lasting initiative of this type, but it is currently in hiatus due to lack of funding and support.

Benefits

Despite the lack of utilization, citizens' conferences can be beneficial to the policy process in a number of areas. One of the goals of the citizens' panel process is to provide an unfiltered analysis of citizen preferences not as uninformed voters but as informed active citizens in the policy process. Such gatherings could help experts and policy-makers craft policy to better serve citizen needs better than existing processes.

The second benefit is indirect. The process itself can serve as a catalyst for citizens. Citizens become lay-experts within their own community on the subject at large and explain the complexities of this policy area to other members of their community. The process works both ways; experts and policymakers gauge citizen reactions, while the better informed "conference citizens" can act as disseminators of information within their own communities. Though it is not expected that eighteen citizens will be able to convince a large population the process does lay the groundwork for support within smaller communities.

¹⁵ Guston, 1998.

¹⁶ Guston, 1998.

¹⁷ The Loka Institute, Available: <http://www.loka.org/pages/panel.htm>, Accessed January 22, 2004.

¹⁸ For more information please see the Jefferson Center website at <http://www.jefferson-center.org/>.

Finally, citizens' panels allow members of the community to feel that policy makers are taking their interests into consideration. Citizens whose opinions or grievances are addressed or at least heard can be transformed into long-term supporters of the organizations whose public policy decisions are under consideration. Policy processes and organizations that are lack transparency are often seen as untrustworthy. In presenting a more public and accessible "face," an organization can change its public persona and engender trust from the public.

The benefits of the citizens' panel process, however, are derived directly from the perceived legitimacy of the process and the panels' standing within the policy community. If the panel is perceived to have little impact on the formulation of public policy, it soon will have little standing within the community.

APPENDIX B: Recruitment of Target Panel

The following table shows the difference between the panel target which was based on data from the Baltimore-Washington Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Area and the actual panel.

	TARGET	ACTUAL
Gender		
Female	9	10
Male	9	8
Age		
18-34	6	10
35-44	5	4
45-54	3	3
55-64	2	1
65+	2	0
Race/Ethnicity		
White	11	13
Black/African		
Am	4	4
Asian	1	1
Hisp/Latino	1	0
Other	1	0
Education		
Some HS	3	1
HS/GED	4	1
Some College	3	4
AD/BA	5	7
Grad	3	5
Income		
0-24	3	2
25-49	4	8
50-74	4	1
75-99	3	4
100+	4	3

APPENDIX C: Solicitation Methods

Organizational Communication

This category of solicitation involved the use of established networks of communication within public and private organizations such as universities, non-profits, associations, civic institutions, religious congregations, and social groups. Staff members created a list of organizations in the area and contacted these organizations regarding the panel. Organizations were asked if they would publicize the panel to their constituents and staff. Members would contact these organizations and ask them if they would agree to pass on to their members, information about the citizens' panel and our search for panelists. Some of our members were recruited by contacting neighborhood advisory commissions and posting information through their listservs or on their newsletters.

Electronic Solicitation

This category is comprised of two methods. The first method was through the use of our website, <http://citizens.gmu.edu>. At the website, interested parties can learn about the citizens' panel and the issue of Critical Infrastructure, apply to be a panelist and contact the project team regarding any questions they may have. The website also served as a point of reference and through its association with the George Mason University gave us legitimacy in the eyes of many interested applicants. The second method we used was solicitation through public list services such as Craig's List, and various other electronic community bullet boards found via the Internet.

Print Advertising

In this solicitation category we produced flyers for the Citizens Panel and posted them in heavy traffic areas such as coffee houses, restaurants, bookstores, libraries, churches, and public bulletin boards. Another method we employed was the use of the classified section in mass circulated papers such as the City Paper in Washington DC.

Face-to-Face Canvassing

This method involved member solicitations in various locations through the Metropolitan DC area. Street intersections, shopping malls, coffee shops, libraries, museums, open-air markets, restaurants, movie houses, train stations, bus and subway stops, parks and churches were all canvassed by a member of the team. Because of the complicated subject matter, the ability of project staff to answer follow-up questions on the spot helped to ease the immediate disinclination of prospective citizens to participate in the panel. This method ultimately served as the most valuable method of recruitment.

APPENDIX D: Initial Recruitment Survey

Citizens' Panel

<http://citizens.gmu.edu>

Screening Questionnaire

Name: _____
Surname *First* *Middle Initial*

Home Address _____
Street Address *Apartment*

City *State* *Zipcode*

Home Phone _____ Email _____

Gender Male Female Age _____

Race/Ethnicity

Asian Hispanic/Latino
Black /African American White/Caucasian
Other _____

Occupation _____

Class of Employment

Government
Private Wage or Salary Worker
Self-Employed Worker in own not incorporated Business

Type of Employment

Management Construction/Maintenance
Service Occupation Self-Employed
Sales/Office Other _____

Household Yearly Income (\$)

0-24,999 75,000-99,999
25,000-49,999 More than 100,000
50,000-74,999

Education (Check Highest Level Completed)

Some High School Associates or Bachelors Degree
Completed High School/GED Graduate Degree
Some College

Are you or an immediate member of your family directly involved in National Security? Yes No

How did you hear about the Citizens' Panel? _____

Please mail completed form to:

Citizens' Panel

George Mason University School of Public Policy, 3401 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201

Tel: (703)993-3351

Fax: (703)993-8215

Email: citizens@gmu.edu

APPENDIX E: Pre-Panel Survey

Citizens' Panel Survey of Attitudes

National Capital Region

November 5-6-7, 2004

The School of Public Policy at George Mason University is conducting a survey of public attitudes toward aspects of the public response to disasters, terrorism and public confidence.

We appreciate your help in answering some questions about these subjects. **Please check, or place an 'X', in the box** that most closely corresponds to your answer to each question.

SECTION 1: Public response to disasters and crises

1A. In the past few years, the Washington area has suffered several potentially disruptive events. For each of the following, please indicate how disruptive these events were to your ***work and daily life***:

	Very disruptive	Some what disruptive	Not particularly disruptive	Not at all disruptive	Not applicable	In what ways were you affected?
Winter storm shutdowns						
September 11 th						
DC Sniper shootings						
Hurricane Isabel						
Anthrax						

1B. Please indicate how disruptive these events were to your **community**:

	Very disruptive	Some what disruptive	Not particularly disruptive	Not at all disruptive	Not applicable	In what ways was the community affected?
Winter storm shutdowns						
September 11 th						
DC Sniper shootings						
Hurricane Isabel						
Anthrax						

1C. Have you ever experienced any other major disruptive events? Yes _____ No _____

If yes, please tell us below what type of event, where it took place, the date, and how disruptive it was to you personally:

Event type, place, year e.g. major earthquake, Calif., 1992 or toxic release, NJ, 2000	Very disruptive	Somewhat disruptive	Not particularly disruptive	Not at all disruptive

2. As a consequence of the events listed below, please indicate how much you feel your daily life at home or work has changed, if at all, and in what ways:

	Daily life changed significantly	Daily life somewhat changed	Daily life not changed very much	Daily life not at all changed	In what ways has your daily life changed?
Winter storm shutdowns					
September 11 th					
DC sniper shootings					
Hurricane Isabel					
Anthrax					

3. If one of the following disruptive events were to occur in your area; in general, how prepared do you feel you are to deal with it?

	Very well prepared	Somewhat prepared	Not particularly prepared	Not at all prepared
Severe weather				
Attack on hazardous material facility				
Attack on public place				
Attack on transportation system				
Bioterrorism				
Chemical weapons				
Radiological dirty bomb contamination				
Nuclear explosion				

4. Which of the following items do you specifically have in your home, and know the exact location of where they are?

	Have in my home, and know where it is	Have in my home, but <i>don't</i> know where it is	Do <i>not</i> have in home
Flashlight			
Battery powered or alternative energy radio			
Spare batteries			
Emergency medical kit			
Food for three days or more			
Water for three days or more			
Secure place to shelter, such as a basement			

5. Please indicate whether you have made specific plans for the following situations, whether you have discussed but not made specific plans, or have not made or discussed plans.

	Have specific plan	Have discussed plan, but none made	No plan made
Family or personal plan for communicating if separated at school or work			
Family or personal plan for meeting if separated at school or work			
Family or personal plan for evacuating the area			

5A. Have you done anything else to prepare for a disruptive event? If so, please describe briefly.

SECTION 2: Citizens perceptions of vulnerability to terrorist attack

6. How likely do you think it is that there will be another terrorist attack in the United States, the Washington region, in your community or your own neighborhood within the next few months: very likely, somewhat likely, not very likely, or not at all likely?

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely
Likelihood of terror attack in U.S. within next few months				
Likelihood of terror attack in Washington region within next few months				
Likelihood of terror attack in my community within next few months				
Likelihood of terror attack in my neighborhood within next few months				

7. How worried are you that you or someone in your family will become a victim of terrorism: very worried, somewhat worried, not too worried, or not worried at all?

	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not very worried	Not at all worried
Worry that you or a family member will become victim of terrorism?				

8. To what extent does the place of origin of any possible terrorist attack, from abroad or from here in the United States, make a difference to how you feel about it?

	Makes a big difference	Makes a moderate difference	Makes a little difference	Does not make a difference
Place of origin of terrorist attack, foreign or here in U.S....				

8A. If it makes a big or moderate difference, please say in a few words how:

9A. How *worried* are you about the following *types* of terrorist attacks?

	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not very worried	Not at all worried
Bomb in public place				
Truck or car bomb				
Bomb in shipping container				
Airplane as weapon				
Suicide bomber				
Attack on transportation system				
Cyber-terrorism				
Attack on hazardous material facility				
Bioterrorism				
Chemical weapons				
Radiological dirty bomb contamination				
Nuclear explosion				

9B. How *likely* is it that the following *types* of terrorist attacks will be conducted in the next year or so?

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely
Bomb in public place				
Truck or car bomb				
Bomb in shipping container				
Airplane as weapon				
Suicide bomber				
Attack on transportation system				
Cyber-terrorism				
Attack on hazardous material facility				
Bioterrorism				
Chemical weapons				
Radiological dirty bomb contamination				
Nuclear explosion				

10A. How *worried* are you about the following specific *targets* being attacked by terrorists?

	Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not very worried	Not at all worried
Chemical plants				
Power plants				
Water facilities				
Public place/stadium				
Airports/airplanes				
Subway systems				
Trains				
Buses				
Highways				
Bridges				
Harbors/ports				
Office buildings				
Schools				
Retail establishments/shopping malls				
Apartment buildings				

10B. How *likely* is it that the following specific *targets* will be attacked by terrorists in the next year or so?

	Very likely	Somewhat likely	Not very likely	Not at all likely
Chemical plants				
Power plants				
Water facilities				
Public place/stadium				
Airports/airplanes				
Subway systems				
Trains				
Buses				
Highways				
Bridges				
Harbors/ports				
Office buildings				
Schools				
Retail establishments/shopping malls				
Apartment buildings				

SECTION 3: Critical infrastructures and interdependence

11A. In the event of a major local crisis, how confident are you that each service would still be available to you?

	Very Confident	Somewhat confident	Not so confident	Not at all confident
Public water (home)				
Gas for home				
Electricity at home				
Home telephone				
Cellular telephone				
Internet and e-mail				
Local broadcast TV				
Cable TV				
Radio				
Public transportation				
Highways				
Banking and finance				
Health care facilities				
Postal services				

11B. If any one of these services were to be interrupted for some reason, either through a natural disaster such as a hurricane, or due to a terrorist or other attack, how long do you estimate you could go without each service before suffering a hardship?

Assume the event were to take place in early November, when the weather is generally still mild.

	Cannot go without	A few hours	Up to a day	Several days	A week or more	Not applicable to me
Public water (home)						
Gas for home						
Electricity at home						
Home telephone						
Cellular telephone						
Internet and e-mail						
Local broadcast TV						
Cable TV						
Radio						
Public transportation						
Highways						
Banking and finance						
Postal services						

11C. Prior to any possible major disruptive event, how much do you estimate you would be willing to spend every month, over and above your normal expenditures, to keep these services functioning?

	Nothing extra	A little more	Some-what more	A good deal more	Twice as much or more
Public water (home)					
Gas for home					
Electricity at home					
Home telephone					
Cellular telephone					
Internet and e-mail					
Local broadcast TV					
Cable TV					
Radio					
Public transportation					
Highways					
Banking and finance					
Postal services					

SECTION 4: Government performance and public confidence

12. In general, how much do you trust the government in Washington to do the right thing?

Always 100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	40%	30%	20%	10%	Never 0%
----------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-------------

13. How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. government to **prevent** further terrorist attacks against Americans in this country: a great deal, a good amount, only a fair amount or none at all?

	A great deal	A good amount	Only a fair amount	None at all
Confidence in ability of U.S. government to prevent further terrorist attacks				
Confidence in ability of state government to prevent further terrorist attacks				
Confidence in ability of local government to prevent further terrorist attacks				

14. How much confidence do you have in the ability of the U.S. federal government, your state government or your local government to help Americans in this country **recover** from terrorist attacks: a great deal, a good amount, only a fair amount or none at all?

	A great deal	A good amount	Only a fair amount	None at all
Confidence in ability of U.S. government to help recover from terrorist attacks				
Confidence in ability of state government to help recover from terrorist attacks				
Confidence in ability of local government to recover from terrorist attacks				

15. From what you know, do you think government spending on homeland security is too high, too low, or about right?

	Too high	About right	Too low
Government spending on homeland security is ...			

16. When it comes to information about possible terrorism activities and homeland security initiatives, some people want to know all the details and make up their own minds, while others prefer to let the government inform them when there is a likely cause for serious concern.

In general, would you say you are satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat unsatisfied or not satisfied, with the amount of information you are receiving regarding possible terrorist actions and government homeland security initiatives?

	Satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat unsatisfied	Not satisfied
I am ... with the information I receive regarding possible terrorist actions				
I am ... with the information I receive regarding government homeland security initiatives				

17. How useful do you find the government's color-coded threat alert system?

	Very useful	Somewhat useful	Not too useful	None at all useful
How useful do you find the government's color-coded alert system?				

18. What should the government focus on more with respect to the following items with respect to both natural disasters and terrorist attacks? Please indicate your preference by numbering your priority from highest, 1, to lowest, 6.

Mitigation of vulnerabilities before system is disrupted	Prevention of a disruption before it occurs	Preparedness to respond in the event a disruption occurs	Reliability or continued functioning of services during a disruption	Response after a disruption occurs	Recovery after a disruption has occurred

SECTION 5: Civil liberties and homeland security

19. Here are some increased powers of investigation that law enforcement agencies might use when dealing with people suspected of terrorist activity, which would also affect our civil liberties. For each, please say if you would favor or oppose it...

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
Adoption of a national I.D. system for all U.S. citizens			
Stronger document and physical security checks for travelers			
Expanded under-cover activities to penetrate groups under suspicion			
Closer monitoring of banking and credit card transactions, to trace funding sources			
Expanded camera surveillance on streets and in public places			
Law enforcement monitoring of Internet discussions in chat rooms and other forums			
Expanded government monitoring of cell phones and email, to intercept communications			

20. Please indicate whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the following statements:

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
I'm concerned about the government gaining access to all of my personal information					
I believe the government has all the information it needs for national security					
In my own home, my privacy is more important than national security					
In my own home, I should be able to use the Internet without worrying about government surveillance					
In my own home, I should be able to use the telephone without worrying about government eavesdropping					
The government should not be able to search my home without notifying me before the search is conducted					
In public places, my autonomy and personal privacy is more important than national security					
In public places, the government should limit its use of surveillance cameras without probable cause					
In public places, I should be able to carry my bags without law enforcement officers being able to examine their contents without probable cause					
Libraries should not have to reveal patron information or borrowing records to law enforcement officers without					

probable cause					
Visitors to landmarks or monuments should not be screened for entry without probable cause					
Government should keep public information, such as location of important nuclear energy facilities, accessible to the public					
Government should keep public information, such as where and when electrical power systems break down, accessible to the public					

21. Are there any other issues or concerns you have about vulnerability to disruptive events, preparedness or public response that you would like us to know about? If so, please describe them briefly in the space below.

SECTION 6: Demographic Questions

1. In what year were you born? _____

2. Are you currently married, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?

- 1 Married
- 2 Separated
- 3 Divorced
- 4 Widowed
- 5 Never married
- 6 Rather not say
- 7 Don't know

3A. Do you attend religious services, meetings or ceremonies in your area?

___ Yes

- No
- Not sure/Rather not say

3B. If yes, how often you attend religious services, meetings or ceremonies in your area?

- Daily
- More than once per week
- Once per week
- Twice per month
- Once per month
- A few times per year
- Once a year
- Less than once per year/never
- Don't Know

4. What is the highest level of education you completed?

- elementary school only
- some high school, did not finish
- completed high school
- some college but didn't finish
- 2 year college degree /A.A./A.S.
- 4 year college degree /B.A/B.S
- some graduate work
- completed masters or professional degree
- advanced graduate work or Ph.D.
- don't know
- rather not say

5. Please check the range that best describes your annual household income from all sources.

This is before taxes and other deductions.

- \$0 - \$14,999
- \$15,000 - \$34,999
- \$35,000 - \$49,999
- \$50,000 - \$74,999
- \$75,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 +
- Don't Know/Rather Not Say

6. Do you consider yourself to be of Hispanic origin?

- Yes
- No
- Don't know/Rather not say

7. Of the following list of racial categories, please check the category which best describes you?

- White
- African American or Black
- Asian, including South Asian
- American Indian or Native American, including Eskimo, Aleut
- Pacific Islander
- Other _____
- Rather not say/No Answer

8. Please check your sex:

- Male
- Female

9. How long have you lived in the Washington, DC area?

APPENDIX F: Post-Panel Survey

CITIZENS' PANEL SURVEY

Introduction

A. Please make a statement (as short or as long as you would like) about the event, the process, and/or the topic:

B. Why did you choose to be a part of the Citizens' Panel? (What made you accept the offer to take part in the Citizens' Panel?)

Questions

1. In general, how do you feel about the Citizens' Panel concept now that you have participated in one?

- Very Satisfied
- Satisfied
- Neutral
- Dissatisfied
- Very Dissatisfied

2. How do you feel about different parts of the Panel?

- | | Very Satisfied | Satisfied | Neutral | Dissatisfied | Very Dissatisfied |
|----------------------|----------------|-----------|---------|--------------|-------------------|
| Breakout sessions | | | | | |
| Plenary sessions | | | | | |
| Videos | | | | | |
| Deliberations | | | | | |
| Paper | | | | | |
| Introductory Session | | | | | |
| Day One | | | | | |
| Day Two | | | | | |
| Day Three | | | | | |
| Day Four | | | | | |

3. Was the time allowed for discussion and deliberation for the Citizens' Panel?

Far too much
A little too much
About right / adequate
Too little
Far too little

4. Was the level of discussion in general?

Far too complex
A bit too complex
About right
A bit simplistic
Very simplistic

5. How satisfied were you that you were able to present your viewpoints?

Very Satisfied
Satisfied
Neutral
Dissatisfied
Very Dissatisfied

6. Did you feel under pressure to agree with the view of the majority?

Very much
Somewhat
Not really
Not at all

7. How frequently did you withhold opinions?

Not at all
Rarely
Occasionally
Very often

8. If you withheld any opinions, why did you do so?

9. What did you think of the time commitment?

10. What is your opinion of the number of people on the Panel?

- There were way too many
- A few less may have helped.
- Just right
- A few more people would help.
- There need to be a lot more people

11. In general, what did you think about your fellow panelists?

- Not enough About right Too much
- Talkative
 - Opinionated
 - Educated
 - Courteous
 -

12. What do you believe is more valuable to you in the Panel format?

- Asking questions of the experts
- Listening to the experts prepared presentation
- Both, equally
- Both, but questions are more important
- Both, but listening is more important

13. How informative were the following expert panel members?

	Very informative	Somewhat informative	Not very informative	Not at all informative
Day 1				
Tricia Wachtendorf				
Jim Rice				
Glenn Cross				
Day 2				
Michael Armstrong				
Fred Krimgold				
Irene Leech				

14. Were you satisfied with the way the following people fulfilled their roles during the Citizens' Panel?

	Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied
Moderator				
Facilitators				
Organizers				

15. Are you satisfied that the staff conducted the event in an unbiased way?

Very satisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied

16. Did you enjoy being part of the Citizens Panel?

Very much	Somewhat	Not too much	Not at all

17. Are there any general comments you would like to add?

APPENDIX G: Schedule

Citizens' Panel on Critical Infrastructure Protection and Public Confidence

George Mason University

3401 N. Fairfax Drive

Arlington, VA 22201

Room 329

November 5-7, 2004

Day 1

Friday

November 5

8:00-9:00 am

Registration

Breakfast

Survey administration

9:00-9:45

Session 1: Setting the Stage

Welcome by Prof. Todd La Porte

Associate Professor

School of Public Policy

Presentation of issues, citizens' panel process, project expectations and ground rules

Panelist introductions:

Name, where you live, something about yourself

9:45-10:00

Break

10:00-12:00 pm

Session 2: Public Response to Disasters and Extreme Events

Brief presentation by Prof. Tricia Watchendorf

Disaster Research Center

University of Delaware

Disaster myth and reality: what really happens when disaster strikes

12:00-12:45

Lunch

12:45-2:45 Session 3: Threats, Vulnerabilities and Interdependencies

 Brief presentation by Supervisory Special Agent Jim Rice
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington Field Office
 Counter terrorism response

 Brief presentation by Special Agent Glenn Cross
 Weapons of Mass Destruction Operations Unit
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Terrorism, weapons and targets

2:45-3:00 Break

3:00-4:30 Breakout sessions (Panelists split up into two groups to talk in detail about the
 previous presentations and concerns).

4:30-4:45 Rapporteur reports to plenary group (Panelists here summarized the discussions
 and concerns that came from the previous breakout session).

4:45-5:00 Wrap-up, preview of next day's agenda

Day 2
Saturday
November 6

8:30-9:00 am Breakfast

9:00-10:45 Session 4: Public Policies for Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland
 Security

 Brief presentation by Prof. Fred Krimgold
 Director, World Institute for Disaster Risk Management
 Virginia Polytechnic and State University
 Infrastructure interdependences and vulnerabilities

 Brief presentation by Mr. Michael Armstrong
 Vice President
 ICF Consulting
 Former Assoc. Director Mitigation, Federal Emergency Management Agency
 Disaster Resistant Communities and critical infrastructure protection planning

10:45-11:00 Break

11:00-12:30 pm	Breakout sessions
12:30-1:15	Lunch
1:15-3:00	Session 5: Risks, Tradeoffs, and Public Confidence in Institutions of Homeland Security
	Brief presentation by Dr. Irene Leech Consumer Affairs Dept. Virginia Polytechnic and State University Public confidence and institutional trustworthiness
3:00-3:15	Break
3:15-4:45	Breakout sessions
4:45-5:00	Rapporteur reports to plenary group
5:00-5:15	Wrap-up, preview of next day's agenda

Day 3
Sunday
November 7

9:30-10:00 am	Coffee and pastries
10:00-12:00 pm	Citizen Panel Deliberation: Small group sessions
12:00-12:45	Lunch
12:45-2:45	Citizen Panel Deliberation: Plenary session
2:45-3:00	Break
3:00-4:30	Panel Report outline preparation
4:30-4:45	Survey administration
4:45-5:15	Process discussion
5:15-5:30	Wrap-up, thank you, and closing remarks

Dean Kingsley Haynes
School of Public Policy
George Mason University

Appendix H: Results from the Post-Panel Survey


At the end of the citizens' panel, participants were surveyed about their views about the process. The results of the survey were important in the immediate period following the panel to identify any egregious shortcomings or failures in our efforts to organize and conduct the activity in a fair and balanced manner.

Panelists approved of the idea of citizens' panels, they enjoyed being a part of one, and they were satisfied with the overall process they experienced. They generally agreed that the project team conducted the activity in an unbiased way. On the whole, panelists felt they were able to express themselves freely, though several felt they had withheld their opinions on some matters. The level of discussion and the time available were generally thought to be about right, and the size of the panel was about right or could have been somewhat larger.


The expert presenters were generally viewed with satisfaction; the panelists thought that Special Agent Rice was particularly informative. The facilitators, the event staff and the project team all received high marks.

The following charts show the results of the main questions on the post-panel survey.


In general, how do you feel about the Citizens' Panel concept?




The time allowed for discussion and deliberation was...




The level of discussion in general was...




Were you satisfied with the opportunities to express your opinions?




Did you feel under pressure to agree with the view of the majority?




How frequently did you withhold opinions?




What is your opinion of the number of citizens on the Panel?




Are you satisfied that the staff conducted the event in an unbiased way?



Were you satisfied with the overall process of the Citizens' Panel?



Did you enjoy being part of the Citizens' Panel?



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